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The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

DEALING WITH SLUMS IN EGYPT: LEARNING FROM THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

A Thesis Submitted to the

Public Policy and Administration Department

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Master of Public Administration

By

Sylvia Maher Habib

Spring17

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Department of Public Policy and Administration

DEALING WITH SLUMS IN EGYPT: LEARNING FROM THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

Sylvia Maher Habib

Supervised by Dr. Khaled Abdelhalim

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to compile, analyze and present information on the current Egyptian government's approaches for dealing with slums to enable the assessment of their success and sustainability. Those approaches are basically eviction, demolition and relocation (80% of the interventions), in situ development (20% of the interventions) and community participation. In addition, the thesis researches international experiences from the developing world, tackling in situ and relocation approaches. The cases were selected in order to come up with their success factors and shed light on their applicability to the Egyptian context. A case study using qualitative analysis demonstrates a typical example of the relocation approach adopted by the Egyptian government; that is Osman Housing (Masaken Osman) in Sixth of October City. In-depth interviews were conducted with the relocated residents from Deweka area to find out whether the government's intervention solved their housing problem or not. The findings show that the Egyptian government's relocation approach concentrated more on trying to eradicate existing slums rather than addressing the socio-economic drives that led to the growth of informal areas including urban poverty. This approach resulted in making the poor even poorer and slum dwellers even more marginalized. The thesis concludes with a set of recommendations based on the learned lessons and success factors of the international experiences introduced in the study, the literature review, and the realities and findings reflected in field work of the case study. These recommendations highlight the need for political and institutional support for intervention programs, promoting community participation and adopting a rights-based approach that recognizes that residents of slum areas have the same rights as other citizens in formal areas.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Dealing with slums, or informal areas in general, is one of the major national urban challenges in Egypt. Slums as well as other informal areas are usually defined and categorized as per their physical conditions and legal position. They are divided into two categories, those of good conditions and others with deteriorated conditions. Areas that are classified as unplanned but at the same time of good conditions constitute 85-90% of informal areas while areas classified as slum with deteriorated living conditions constitute 10-15% of informal areas (ISDF, 2008). During and after the 1970s, Egypt witnessed rural migrations to cities by the poor who sought better living conditions. They resorted to poor housing types that included dilapidated areas in old parts of the city including graveyards and shacks. Formal slums and squatter slums may necessitate different intervention strategies. On the one hand, deteriorated formal slums need special attention considering the fact that most deteriorated popular quarters are of urban value either historically or architecturally, therefore necessitate some rehabilitation. On the other hand, in unplanned areas the networks of residents provide jobs, services and infrastructure to the dwellers. Besides, slums differ in the ability of their residents to provide such amenities. This is normally compensated for by resorting to nearby public services. Slums are considered a threat to its own dwellers in terms of housing and living conditions. This is evident in the criteria set by the Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF) for unsafe areas (Abdelhalim, 2014). The ISDF is a fund that was established according to the Presidential Decree # 305/2008 after the fall of the Duwaika rock which resulted in the death of around 110 people living at the base of the Mukattam Mountain. The main goal of ISDF is ensuring safe housing and enhancing the quality of life of the inhabitants in unsafe areas in Egypt (Pieterse, 2011).

ISDF classified unsafe areas to four types in accordance to the degree of risk: first category includes buildings in locations threatening human life, such as areas in danger of rock slides, train accidents or flooding; second category is given to deteriorated buildings of low

resistance to natural disasters; third category is for threats on inhabitants' health as a result of lack of clean water, proper sewerage, etc.; fourth category is for threats to the inhabitants' stability in terms of lack of ownership or the lack of freedom in dealing with the inhabitants properties. Any delay in solving this issue will result in intensifying the problem. In addition to the threats to dwellers of existing slums, without serious actions by the Egyptian government together with civil society, the number of slum dwellers is expected to increase in Egypt, given also the worsening livelihood conditions of Egyptians due to the slow economic recovery since 2011 (Abdelhalim, 2010).

The challenge of slums is not only limited to Egypt, but it also involves most of the developing countries. It is therefore considered as a global phenomenon. For several decades in developing countries, many attempts have been made in the pursuit of solving the dilemma of the constant growth of informal and slum settlements; many of these attempts have relatively succeeded, but unfortunately, others are still struggling towards finding a solution (Pieterse, 2011). This thesis follows the rationale of learning from other countries' successful experiences in dealing with slums through identifying their success factors and then correlate them to the Egyptian context. This linking and peer-learning is very conscious of the need to consider the particular conditions of the receiving country and not to blindly recommend what worked in one country to another country.

Almost thirty two per cent of the world's urban population (about 1 billion people) lives in informal areas, especially slums, and the greater part of them in the developing world (UN-Habitat, 2003). Besides, 'urbanization of poverty' or the fact that poverty is moving to cities with no tangible actions taken by governments is blazing the trail to a massive increase in the number of slum dwellers worldwide (Arnott, 2009).

Figure 1 illustrates socio economic inequality as one of the root causes of the growth of slums. Poverty, income inequality together with insufficiency in the housing provision system

result in slum formation. Besides, rural-urban migration where rural areas residents, with deprived living conditions and low income move to urban areas seeking a better quality of life, but at the same time contributing to the city's informality. (UN-Habitat, 2003).

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┌─────────────────────┐   ┌─────────────────────┐   ┌─────────────────────┐
│ Inequality of income│───│ Lack of economic    │───│ Residents of rural  │
│                     │   │ growth              │   │ areas migration     │
└─────────────────────┘   └─────────────────────┘   └─────────────────────┘
            │                                                   │
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    ┌───────────────┐                              ┌─────────────────────┐
    │    Poverty    │                              │ Insufficiency in    │
    │               │                              │ affordable housing  │
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                    │ Formation of Slums and      │
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
Figure 1: Formation of Slums

Adapted from United Nations Human Settlements Program, 2003, Pg 17

In this sense, there is a compelling need for more comprehensive studies of the government's interventions in this respect and at the same time to look into the practices of different cities and towns that managed to find viable solutions to the challenge of slums for the sake of benefiting from learned lessons. Therefore, this thesis aims to compile, analyze and present information on a number of the current Egyptian government's approaches towards dealing with slums to assess their success and sustainability. Meanwhile, international experiences, particularly in the developing world, will also be demonstrated and analyzed in order to come up with their success factors or elements of success. The research then aims to shed light on the applicability of these success factors to the Egyptian government's intervention strategies for facing the existing problem of slums.

The purpose of this paper is to stimulate policy reforms as well as tangible endeavors, real actions and initiatives for confronting the slums challenge in Egypt. Concrete examples of international experiences will provide elements and factors of success in dealing with slums, which in turn will pave the way for suggesting a set of long term and short term measures to be implemented by the Egyptian government in cooperation with civil society and other stakeholders.

Statement of Purpose

Existence of slums and the downgraded living conditions they offer are a sign of the failure of the Egyptian government in dealing with this challenge and its root causes. The Egyptian government has established the Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF) in 2008 to deal with slums. The ISDF replaced the terms "slums," and "informal settlements," to two other names: "unsafe" and "unplanned" areas, following the new unified Building Law (Law 119/2008) which provided these new categories (ISDF, 2012). ISDF was established in order to ensure safe housing, and provide funding as well as technical assistance to local government to carry out slum development projects. However, the government interventions in dealing with slums remained short of being successful in relation to the scale of the phenomenon as well as the sustainability of the solutions. The real problem is that the Egyptian government deals with the issue of slums on the basis of its housing safety. Whereas, a holistic approach tackling poverty, labor skills as well as social capital and other livelihood factors should be adopted for the sake of improving the livelihood of slum dwellers (Abdelhalim, 2014).

Considering the above, concrete interventions and setting up new policies and strategies for improving the current condition of slums and the livelihood of their inhabitants is crucial. The Egyptian government needs to learn from the success of international experiences in dealing with slums in other parts of the world. In this respect, the research will flag this need and will fill a gap in knowledge by providing ready-to-use principles and measures based on the analysis of

international experiences in dealing with slums. In parallel, there is a compelling need for studying the different intervention strategies which the Egyptian government usually offers for facing the existing problem of informal settlements. Those solutions are basically slum eviction, demolition and relocation, which represents around 80% of interventions, in situ slum upgrading, which represents 20% of interventions and participatory upgrading, which is applied to informal settlements.

Therefore, a field study was conducted on Osman Housing, as a typical case of relocation, considering that it is the most common approach adopted by the Egyptian government. In addition, the thesis presents cases of in situ upgrading both on the local and international levels as well as a case of relocation on the international level to cover the other approach in Egypt and globally, which allows for comparability. The public housing project was offered to the dwellers of some slum areas following the collapse of a rockslide in Manshiet Nasser in 2008 and resulted in the deaths of 119 or more citizens (Tadamun, 2015). This will help recognize whether there are lessons to be drawn from such experiences for scaling up and replication or vice versa and that we should propose new policies and implementation measures to be adopted by the Egyptian government for better performances. The research will examine the sufficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of government efforts in dealing with the challenge of slums in Egypt, especially Cairo, and how Egypt can benefit from other global successful experiences. This may lead, if taken up, to changing Egypt's position on the world map of dealing with slums.

Research Question

A number of efforts exerted by the Egyptian government have not yet achieved complete success in eliminating the slums phenomenon (Abdelhalim, 2014). Such efforts are mainly embodied in the role of ISDF which is the official authority that is responsible for planning, financing and monitoring slums redevelopment projects. Given the remaining number of slums,

the progress of ISDF in redeveloping them and the scale of the phenomenon, that is expected to increase with the recent economic challenges, the efforts that have been done so far are not enough. The Osman Housing case will shed light on whether the efforts already exerted are effective and sustainable enough or not. The question here is whether we have looked deep enough into global practices on dealing with slums to learn from them or not. The answer is obviously that there are still many knowledge gaps to be filled.

Accordingly, this study attempts to present some global experiences in order to solve one of Egypt's most pressing problems: slums. In order to do this, this thesis is trying to answer the question **where is Egypt within the global experience of dealing with slums**? This will require answering the following questions:

- o What is the current state of slums in Egypt?
- o What is the current Egyptian government approach/strategy for dealing with slums, and what is its effectiveness and success?
- o How does Egypt's current position vis-à-vis slums compare to other global practices?
- o What are the international experiences' factors of success?
- o How applicable are these success factors in Egypt?
- o What could be learned to enhance the current policies and implementation measures towards declaring Cairo as "a city free from slums"?

# Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Methodology

Figure 2: Conceptual Framework

Egyptian Government Strategy and Efforts for Dealing with Slums

At first, ignoring informal areas was the normal attitude by the Egyptian government towards slums and informal settlements until adopting a policy of eradicating them. In the 1980s, the government started developing strategies to halt their growth (Abdelhalim, 2014). Developing new cities on desert land is considered an alternative for the growth of informal settlements on agricultural land. In addition, the local government's approach towards slums continued to be demolition and relocation. In 1993, a national program was launched for redeveloping 20 slum areas. In its second phase, this national program conducted a survey for identifying the informal areas which require upgrading and those requiring complete demolishing. Moreover, it was announced in many cases that there was a necessity for tearing down slums which required forcibly removing residents to remote new cities lacking essential services. In such cases, residents were forced to make a new life other than their normal sources lives. Therefore, residents of such areas have always resisted these plans (Madbouly, 2009).

The Egyptian government is trying to adopt two types of approaches in dealing with informal areas. The first approach is preventative by which measures are taken to limit or stop the growth of informal settlements. The second approach is the interventionist one where the government intervenes to improve or remove informal areas (Sims, 2008).

Preventive approaches

Preventative approaches include the following:

Belting program: a planning technique formalized by the government to halt the outward expansion of informal areas by surrounding them with planned areas (Tadamun, 2014). This program was implemented from 2004 to 2008 as a part of a huge informal settlements upgrading program. The program included two stages, the first stage was from 1994–2004 and basically aimed at providing basic services and infrastructure such as provision of water, electricity, sanitary, landscaping, street paving, greening as well as developing deteriorated areas.

The second stage, from 2004–2008, included the informal settlement belting program. This stage concentrated on setting detailed plans that would limit the expansion of informal settlements. When the program was concluded, only basic urban services of electricity, water, sanitary drainage, municipal cleanliness and road paving were provided for about 352 informal areas. No real belting was actually implemented (Khalifa, 2011).

Urban growth boundaries (UGB): a planning means used to define limits for urban growth within a span of 20 years (Nada, 2014). Within the Egyptian context, this planning tool aims at restricting the development of informal settlements on agricultural land. This is done as an integral part of setting the strategic plan of the city and it specifies new areas to be added to the city for any future urban expansion. On the grounds, this process encounters a number of difficulties which delays developing the strategic plans, and accordingly land owners are encouraged to build informally. (Nada, 2014).

Banning the construction on a desert land owned by the state: the state is entitled to protect public and private properties and eradicate any violations (Amnesty, 2011).

Furthermore, the government issued a number of laws and regulations to protect agricultural land by **limiting informal development on agricultural areas** (Sims, 2008). In this respect, the government issued a military declaration in 1996 which entailed that the illegal expansion on agricultural land was a criminal act (USAID, 2010). In 2004, this declaration was cancelled and replaced by law No.116/1983 which stated the illegality of constructing any buildings on agricultural land or any practices to use agricultural areas for building purposes (Tadamun, 2014).

Unfortunately, the growth of informal areas has not been limited by the aforementioned preventative measures, but rather they helped redirect the growth of informal settlements from one area to another and increased corruption at the local level. For instance, the national building standards set by the Housing and Building National Research Center (HBRC), are suitable for middle and high classes housing units, but are not suitable for lower income families. This forces

developers to work informally since they know that the building units they provide, which comply with the national building codes, will not be suitable for their targeted population (Nada, 2014). As a result, the regulations are ignored and minimum standards for safety are not met. Accordingly, the building code enforced benefits developers and local government officials and harms residents, particularly of slums.

Interventionist approaches

Interventionist approaches include the following:

- eviction, demolition and slum relocation,

- in situ slum upgrading

- and participatory upgrading (informal settlements)

Eviction, Demolition and Slum Relocation

The Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF)

ISDF provides a certain categorization of unsafe informal areas; they are given a grade from one to four. Grade one defines the areas in which inhabitants lives are threatened due to environmental hazards threatening to life such as rock slides railway accidents or flooding. Grade two represents areas of inappropriate housing conditions. Grade three is the areas exposed to health risks such as the lack of clean drinking water, improved sanitation or situated near to industrial pollution. Grade four is the unsafe areas lacking security of tenure such as areas located on lands owned by the state (ISDF, 2012).

This grading scale should prioritize the interventions of ISDF in unsafe areas. According to ISDF, grade one residents should be relocated to a nearby neighboring area. Residents living in grade two areas should either be relocated, or an in situ development should take place. As for residents of grade three, the government should intervene to solve the public health issue by developing public services. Grade four residents should be granted legalized land tenure (Runkel, 2009).

Another role of ISDF is implementing socio-economic programs concentrating on empowering the population of informal settlements. Nevertheless, access to information is not available about whether particular programs or interventions are implemented or not. Sometimes residents' houses are eradicated without previous communication or even consultation with residents who are not formally notified through written notices (Tadamun, 2015). Even though the grading system set by the ISDF to categorize unsafe areas is implying a rationalized approach towards dealing with unsafe areas, yet this has not usually been adopted (Amnesty, 2011).

Relocating residents is when residents of a certain area are moved from one place to another, which is usually at a remote distance from their original area. Based on a review of the literature and the number of cases the researcher has come across, this approach represents almost 80% of the government's interventions in this respect. The government vacates the houses, destroys them and residents are offered new houses, usually in public housing at low rental rates. There are two types of relocation, either voluntary or by force. Voluntary relocation is when citizens agree to the resettlement conditions that the government proposes, while forced relocation takes place when residents do not have other choices and are subject to forced eviction by security personnel (Patel, 2013).

Forced relocation according to international experiences necessitates that the process should be rationalized and resorted to only as last solution. Besides, in case displacement is inevitable, inhabitants ought to be fully compensated or provided with alternative housing that is equivalent in quality and amenities to their original ones. In addition, the government should facilitate and support the residents throughout the transition period to the new settlement. Besides, the government should provide the needed help and assistance to the evacuated families until they reestablish their former standards of living (Perera, 2014).

As previously mentioned, the ISDF is the entity concerned with classifying the unsafe areas that should be removed and deciding if the inhabitants need to be relocated. However, in

some cases, armed forces and security personnel are part of the eviction process along with the governorate and ISDF. In such cases, demolition and clearance of the area, construction of new houses and provision of public service are the responsibility of the governorate (Amnesty, 2011).

For further analysis of the relocation approach, the researcher has conducted a field work in the area of Osman Housing as an example of a place to which some slum dwellers were transferred as a solution for their unsafe areas. Chapter five of the thesis will demonstrate the visit, interviews with the dwellers and the findings.

In Situ Slum Upgrading

Telal Zeinhom

Another approach adopted by the Egyptian government is the in situ slum upgrading which entails providing the necessary development in the same area without having to move the residents to remote locations (UN-Habitat, 2003). Based on a review of the literature and the number of cases the researcher has come across, this approach represents only 20% of the government's interventions in this respect. An example of an area that was upgraded adopting this technique is Telal Zeinhom which is a large squatter area located in old Cairo. The place was originally provided by Cairo governorate, as temporal solution, for those who lost their houses for any reason (Ghoneim, 2014). In a short time, poor people from other neighborhoods searching for shelter resorted to the area and built their own dilapidated wooden huts (Tadamun, 2013).

In 1999, the upgrading project started as per the instructions of Suzan Mubarak after a visit to the Red Crescent Society (RCS) in Zeinhum and witnessing the deteriorated conditions of the area. RCS together with Cairo governorate, with the help of financial resources from businessmen, as well as the participation of contractors who volunteered to build the units without charging the governorate or RCS helped in implementing the project (Ghoneim, 2014). The upgrading project was based on two main elements. The first element concentrated on developing the educational, cultural and health levels of citizens. The second element

concentrated on eradicating the current slums and establishing modern buildings according to the standard building codes to provide healthy and environmental friendly area. Meanwhile, the residents to be moved to temporal houses basically in Helwan, Nahda and Mokattam until the work is concluded and they return to their original residence in Zeinhom (Tadamun, 2013).

Endorsed by political will, the rehabilitation project was implemented in three phases and ended in 2011. During the first phase, 348 housing units in 29 buildings were constructed. Throughout the second phase 972 housing units in 81 buildings were built. Within the third phase, 1136 units in 71 buildings were constructed. During the period they spent away from their original houses, households were offered some developmental activities including educational, social, cultural, vocational and health programs. The activities included the following:

- 21 literacy classes were opened

- Provision of enhancement classes for students.

- Providing the necessary assistance for the return of students who left school for financial reasons.

- The establishment of a social and cultural center for women.

- Training of youth through the establishment of an information technology center with the help of the Ministry of Information.

- Training on handicraft activities.

- Health awareness campaigns.

- The establishment of a hospital, laboratory and a pharmacy (Ghoneim, 2014).

Zeinhom Project Shortcomings

Unfortunately, in terms of sustainability, the level of services and maintenance provided started to decline, particularly after the 2011 revolution which resulted in the loss of the political support for the project embodied in the person of Suzan Mubarak. Furthermore, the work of maintenance was transferred to the local district which resulted in the deterioration of public

spaces, green areas as well as street lighting. This was shown in the fact that when street lamps were burned, this was not done anymore. Consequently, the streets turned dark during the night and residents had to extend wires from their homes to light lamps outside the buildings. In addition, the gardens became barren due to misuse and lack of required maintenance. Besides, when asked about the level of satisfaction towards the size of their assigned flats, many residents complained from the fact that they were small and did not accommodate the size of their families that vary from 4 to 8 members. This forced them to turn the living room into another bedroom for their kids. The same complaint was raised regarding the small size of the bathroom and kitchen (Tadamun, 2013).

As for job opportunities in the area, most of the residents complained about the provided opportunities for men. They explained that most of the training programs provided during the implementation of the project were for women. Considering the fact that the residents of Zeinhom are of very low income, this required providing small business opportunities for them, but the project only provided insufficient places for this purpose. Accordingly, the residents lost their shops after the upgrading of the area and the removal of their source of living and were not able to get any alternative after returning to the area. Therefore, some residents had to make a place to earn money from, by making some illegal changes and extensions to their houses (Ghoneim, 2014).

Zeinhom case shows that in situ slum upgrading is fundamental, yet the government's neglect of the socio-economic context of the residents before the upgrading has caused a significant dissatisfaction on the part of residents. It also resulted in the decrease of sustainability in the social dimension during and after the project. In terms of sustainability, the project failed to maintain the required level of provided services and maintenance.

Participatory Upgrading

One of the accepted and common approaches in developing countries today is participatory slum improvement (UN-Habitat, 2003). This approach addresses community integration in the rehabilitation projects. Upgrading in this sense would focus on community needs as determined by its members and would guarantee the sustainability of the project. A participatory approach when applied correctly, conditions will improve and dwellers will become satisfied (Khalifa, 2011). A basic element of a participatory upgrade is collecting data on the specified location accurately by the community members themselves.

Hai el Salam

An early case, which is considered the first one, of a participatory upgrading project is Hai el Salam in Ismailia. This project was implemented mainly for the purpose of reconstructing the Suez Canal area after the long war with Israel (Matteucci, 2006). The reconstruction plans were made by British consultants in collaboration with the United Kingdom Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In cooperation with Egyptian experts, the Ismailia Master Plan (IMP) was developed to upgrade a number of areas with deteriorated conditions. In 1978, Hai el Salam in al-Hekr area was selected for being a major slum area in the city that needed redevelopment. This was a considerable transformation in the government's strategy that has always been demolition and relocation of residents to remote areas. The project proposed to guarantee security of tenure to the residents and provide basic services for successful results (Ibrahim, 2014).

The British consultants were keen not to present the conventional approaches in this project through providing housing units that do not meet the residents' requirement, but they rather proposed a new approach of encouraging the dwellers to build their own houses and also own them. This original approach at the time contributed to better utilization of public resources in developing the existing deteriorated areas with the supply of minimal infrastructure and

services. This was implemented through proposing a set of new policies for the provision of security of tenure, infrastructure and building materials to poor families. This is in addition to simplifying the administrative procedures for acquiring loans to help the poor residents construct their houses (Matteucci, 2006).

The outcomes of the project were seen in infrastructure improvement that turned this poor and marginalized area of the city into a modern and developed location. The success of the project was mainly due to the resident's active involvement and participation in implementation. This resulted in turning the project into an alternative to the conventional authoritarian top-down approaches previously adopted by the Egyptian government. Unfortunately, this conception of involving the community was not replicated in any further initiatives. Yet, it stands as a prove that slums can be upgraded into normal city districts through dwellers participation that encourages their investment in improving their housing conditions.

Participatory Development Program (PDP)

Another example of a participatory project that took place in Egypt in cooperation with aid agencies is the Participatory Development Program (PDP) when the Egyptian government sought the help of the German government in its endeavor to find a sustainable resolution for the informal areas in Egypt. The Egyptian Ministry of Planning, the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ) and the German Financial Cooperation (KFW), in addition to the Egyptian Ministry of Local Development, NGOs, and the three governorates of Cairo, Giza, and Qalioubiya implemented the project. It has been carried out from 2004 to 2014, then extended later until 2018 (Nour, 2011). The program was launched in two pilot projects, Boulaq el-Dakrour in Giza governorate and Manshiet Nasser in Cairo governorate. The goal of the program was to alleviate poverty in urban areas and achieve sustainable urban development through social inclusion and good governance (Piffero, 2010)

The first model for this participatory urban upgrading approach was Al-Amer Street, one of the busiest and central streets in Boulaq el-Dakrour, where GIZ wanted to demonstrate that the participation of the population can be a solution for urban upgrading. In this project, the district and GIZ supplied material and equipment at reasonable prices. The interventions were mainly street paving, painting of house facades, establishment of a recreational space and tree planting. This street included a number of schools, a youth club and a vocational training center. The population participated actively and nominated a representative who was entitled to collect money from inhabitants and buy the needed materials for painting the facades. They also took part on the decision making about transforming an empty space that was not used effectively into a recreational area to include a playground and a computer center (Nour, 2011).

The second intervention was in Zeinin Street as per the request of the Governor after witnessing the success of the first model. Zeinin Street was suffering from traffic congestion and the prevalence of street vendors stands. Unfortunately, this second intervention was not successful as the first one due to the failure of space reorganization which hindered shopkeepers from displaying their merchandise properly in the street as well as the fact that the new traffic direction did not allow mini-buses to stop as frequently as possible to pick up passengers. What hindered the success of this second model of intervention was mainly the unwillingness of traffic authorities to get involved in the process, as well as the opposition of the shopkeepers to adhere to the new limits set for exposing their merchandise. (Piffero, 2009).

As for the environmental field, a series of activities were initiated within the project including garbage collection and organizing awareness cleaning campaigns. This involved the participation of around 200 university students. In addition, training was conducted for a number of environmental pioneers. This resulted in a partial progress in the solid waste collections since the containers were not sufficient and garbage mountains remained to be a feature observed in the district (Nour, 2011).

Among the difficulties that faced the implementation of this participatory project was overestimating the level of support to the concept of participatory upgrading by the Egyptian government. This was shown in the fact that during the first stages, local authorities were hesitant towards accepting or perceiving the project's activities. Besides, the unavailability of financial Egyptian resources made the project difficult to achieve, especially with the centralized budgeting system of the government that created obstacles in reaching the higher administrative systems to fulfill the required needs. Therefore, enabling governorates as a start and then district administrations should have been implemented for better utilization of sectorial budget allocation (Nour, 2011).

In light of the above demonstrated approaches and cases, the formation of slums is a direct product of the continuous unsuccessful and insufficient practices by the Egyptian government towards dealing with informal areas and slums. We have an opportunity to move forward in this respect if we study some of the international experiences in the developing world and attempt applying some of their success factors in the Egyptian context.

Moreover, the argument in this study is intended to verify the following hypotheses:

- The existence of slum challenge in Egypt is due to the government's inability to effectively deal with it through the adoption of effective policies and sustainable solutions.

- Since other developing countries have developed globally and acknowledged successful experiences in dealing with slums, the success factors learned out of these practices can be useful to Egypt.

- If the Egyptian government adopts the success factors learned from international experiences after adjusting them to the Egyptian context, it can effectively face the slum challenge and improve its global position in acting on the issue.

Relevance of International Experiences from Other Developing Countries

As mentioned above, the Egyptian government needs to learn from the success of international experiences in dealing with slums in other parts of the world.

In this respect, we need to adopt some of the ready-to-use principles and measures based on the analysis of international practices in dealing with slums. Thus, chapter four of the thesis includes a study of some international practices in the developing world on dealing with slums. In spite of the fact that cities included in this analysis are quite different in terms of culture, history, economy, geography as well as some social and organizational differences, yet there are similar issues in the necessary approaches for achieving results.

Potential Review/Improvement of Policies and Legislations Addressing Slums in Egypt

It is apparent that the Egyptian government needs to do more than providing a better-quality infrastructure since this could not solely solve the issue of informal settlements and slums. Accordingly, the government is obliged to set policies and stipulate adequate tools that would help it find comprehensive solutions to such problems (Hegazy, 2015). In chapter six of the thesis, a detailed set of recommendations is included for the Egyptian government in order to develop and enhance its practices towards a successful slum upgrading approach.

Methodology

The discussion in this thesis basically builds on a **qualitative analysis** technique referring to a number of secondary resources and demonstrating the findings in a logical and integrated manner. The data mainly consists of information on the current Egyptian government's interventions and data on the experiences in the developing world, documented interview transcripts, field notes from observations as well as document analysis. Resources consulted in the thesis are mainly reports of international agencies, books, country reports and journal articles. The research will focus on analyzing the success factors of other experiences in developing countries to find out the possibility of applying the measures taken by other cities in Egypt.

Besides, the researcher selected Osman Housing (Masaken Osman) in Sixth of October City to be the **case study** of this paper. The place is an example of an area to which the residents of some slum areas in Cairo were relocated as a solution offered by the government for their unsafe areas. The purpose of selecting a case study is to find out the level of satisfaction of its residents and how the government intervened to solve their housing problem.

A number of in-depth interviews were conducted with the dwellers of Osman Housing for the sake of close interacting with them and learning more about their living conditions, the availability of facilities and basic services, as well as other needs and necessities from their perspective. In this sense, the dwellers' voices, opinions and stories are heard which is important for understanding the impact of resettlement on their lives, and hence is key to developing effective intervention strategies.

Furthermore, this study includes some proposed measures, principles and procedures for an effective and successful slum upgrading processes learned from international experience. These principles should be considered the basic criteria for the design and implementation of upgrading programs in Egypt. Adopting such criteria guarantees a successful upgrading process.

Sampling

Non-probability purposive sampling is the research sampling method used in this study as the main goal is in-depth idiographic understanding rather than general nomothetic understanding of the life of Osman Housing dwellers. This idiographic method adopted throughout the research helped studying the behavior of human subjects involved in the study by a detailed analysis of individual cases. The main focus is on detailed description rather than on generalizations (Battaglia, 2011).

Furthermore, the researcher adopted the **snowballing** technique to collect as much information as possible from different parties. The researcher interviewed six families living in Osman Housing who volunteered in participating and those initial participants helped adding four additional study participants.

Ethical Considerations

Considering the fact that this thesis involves interacting with human subjects and collecting data related to human issues, the researcher obtained all the required approvals from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to conducting any interviews. In addition, the researcher paid the necessary attention to other ethical considerations in the process of data collection. The researcher was aware of the responsibility of conducting the research and communicated appropriately with the participants. Before conducting the interviews, participants were fully aware of their rights, what risks they might face (if any) and what benefits they might gain. They were also informed that participating was completely voluntary and up to them whether to take part in the study or not and that responses would be taken with high confidentiality. All audiotape recordings and interview transcripts were safely kept. No revealing or identifying information were included in this study. The researcher was keen to apply the above-mentioned procedures so that validity and reliability of the research would be realized.

Chapter Three: Literature Review

In addition to the literature reviewed in the Conceptual Framework chapter, chapter three discusses the different definitions, dangers, causes and economic effects of the slums phenomenon worldwide and particularly in Egypt. Besides, more literature is covered in the chapters of International Experience, Conclusion and Recommendations.

Slums

'Slum' is a general term under which different classifications of settlements are included, such as informal settlements, shantytowns and low-income communities. 'Ashwa'iyyat' is the term that is known in Egypt for slums, which means 'haphazard' or 'disordered' (Sims, 2008). This term usually refers to informal areas that are basically characterized by narrow streets, very high residential densities, the deprivation of open spaces and inadequate infrastructure and services. It also refers to the areas which are classified as unplanned and constructed on illegal lands and suffer from poor infrastructure and public services to fulfill their basic needs.

Like many other parts of the world, Egypt is witnessing rapid growth in its cities. 43% of Egypt's population lives in 223 cities, 56% of which are concentrated in Greater Cairo and Alexandria (UN-Habitat, 2010). This rapid urbanization is considered one of the major problems facing urban development in Egypt and is one of the key reasons of the growth of informal and unsafe areas in Egypt.

A survey was carried out by ISDF in 2009 and showed that unsafe areas in Cairo contain approximately 1.1 million inhabitants (Khalifa, 2011). These residents are in deep need of instant actions to enhance their livelihood conditions.

One of the main concerns of the United Nations is facing the serious challenge of slums and addressing the needs of slum dwellers to the access of basic urban services (UN-Habitat, 2003). According to the UN-Habitat, slum dwellers are basically a group of people who lack one or more of the following:

- Adequate-living area in terms of space.

- Appropriate shelter of a permanent nature capable of protecting from probable

   climate changes

- Access to pure clean water

- Access to proper sanitation facilities

- Security of tenure

This criterion is also adopted by ISDF in its categorization of unsafe areas.

It is worth pointing out the New Urban Agenda adopted by the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) took place in Quito, Ecuador from 17 to 20 October 2016, and signed by Egypt (Un-Habitat, 2016). The UN describes the document as an "inclusive, action-oriented" document, and proclaims that it will guide the next twenty years of sustainable and transformative urban development worldwide.

Similar to all previous UN-Habitat conferences, the Habitat III addressed a crisis; this crisis entails the problems facing cities which require urgent actions. Among the commitments included in the New Urban Agenda (NUA) is providing basic services for all citizens, including access to proper affordable housing, safe drinking water and sanitation, education, healthcare and family planning, culture and access to communication technologies (United Nations, 2016). Moreover, the conference addressed the fact that cities are some of the most unequal locations, in terms of basic rights, wealth, and political power. The NUA addresses the need to make cities more inclusive and comprehensive by engaging slum dwellers, women, minority groups, youth as well as the elderly (Un-Habitat, 2016). The NUA considers informal settlements and slums not just a matter of housing quality, they rather represent the quality of life that people have, their health conditions and their chances at a good education.

For Egypt to sign on the NUA is a step forward towards acknowledging the rights of slum dwellers by taking bold new decisions such as granting property rights to slum dwellers and

stopping forced evictions. For the commitment towards and implementing the NUA in Egypt, proper transposing of the new international urban agenda to the national and local level should be identified through clear mechanism for implementation.

Another description of slums is that: "Slums are neglected parts of cities where housing and living conditions are appallingly poor" (Hatita, 2014). The common definition of 'slum' suggests that it is: "…a contiguous settlement where the inhabitants are characterized as having inadequate housing and basic services" (Steering Committee on Urbanization, 2011). A slum is often neglected by the public authorities and not considered equal part of the city (Khalifa, 2011). Slums are places where health conditions are degenerated because of the complexity of accessing healthcare services.

The fact that the issue of slums is becoming persistent in many cities all over the world, this led scholars to try and find causes and solutions to the problem in order to analyze the phenomenon. For example, John Turner, one of the most famous scholars who adopted the notion of **self-help housing**, argued that the slum dwellers are able to improve their own lives through upgrading and constructing their informal houses. He believed that the slum inhabitants had the right to upgrade their houses based on their needs (Runkel, 2009). Turner argued that this approach led to people-centered development and urban poor's autonomy. He added that inhabitants may add elements that fit their needs and life situations as per their resources. Turner's Self-help approach was criticized by critics arguing that it helped to maintain the status quo and did not challenge the sources of inequalities and injustice (Frediani, 2009).

Another theorist is Nakamura who advocated that slum upgrading was **secure land tenure** since there was a solid association between security of tenure and housing construction (Gelder, 2007). He believed that there was constantly a struggle and fear on the dwellers part from the probability of eviction which resulted in lack of trust that led to poor investment in their houses. He argued that if people felt more secure and expected future benefits from their houses,

they would be more likely to invest in construction. He added that attractive physical attributes, such as the size, layout, amenities and of course infrastructure, would encourage slum dwellers to invest in construction (Mukhija, 2002).

Slums in Egypt are a phenomenon resulted from urbanization and other socio-economic changes that occurred through the past four decades (Abdelhalim, 2014). Most of the Egyptian cities are now characterized by urban informality. One of the misconceptions made by the Egyptian government is perceiving slums as the fault of their dwellers rather than being victims of neglect and poverty. This perception of judging slums mainly on their poor physical conditions is the main reason behind the government's ineffective approach towards removing them and relocating inhabitants.

During the course of the last few decades, a number of policy approaches to slums have been sought globally, many of which focused on interventions for defending the rights of slum residents as well as enabling them to enhance their living conditions (UN-Habitat, 2003). Considering the fact that, in most cases, the critical analysis and lessons learned from previous endeavors and attempts in dealing with major challenges lead to effective policy approaches, this can be very useful to the Egyptian case, with developing new policy approaches in response to the new requirements.

Slums provide poor basic services and low-quality housing for their dwellers (Runkel, 2009). It is worth mentioning that the prevalence of slum areas varies dramatically across cities of the developing world (UN-Habitat, 2003). In other words, there are regional distinctions in terms of slums; slums in the Middle East are very different in physical and safety conditions from those in Africa or in South East Asia. For instance, slums range from high residential density buildings in Hong Kong to shacks made of mud in Cape Town and each variation has a different name (UN-HABITAT, 2006). For example, in India, slum areas or "chawls" are usually a crowded block consisting of apartments having only one room with shared bathrooms. They

also have a different form of slums called the "zopadpatti" or a hut made of fragile materials, regularly situated in a packed slum area inside or on the borders of a city.

It is easy to identify the serious concerns and impacts of slums on human wellbeing as follows:

- Hazardous health conditions causing slum children to suffer from various diseases such as pneumonia, malaria, diarrhea and measles (Homeless International, 2013).

- Lack of education and consequently lack of the skills needed to acquire decent jobs (Steering Committee on Urbanization, 2011).

- Unsafety of women; violence against women is usually recurrent (Mayra Gómez, 2008).

- Slum dwellers are more likely subject to natural disasters and climate change (Ian Douglas, 2008).

- Political and social insularity or exclusion that is evident in deprivation of voting in elections as well as exclusion from development policies and fundamental rights (Nijman, 2009). Accordingly, tension between different social groups may easily occur as a result of being deprived of the same rights that other city dwellers enjoy, which in turn may lead to social exclusion .

The issue of slums is very critical all over the world. It is evident in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) and particularly MDG #7, target # 4 which states "Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers" (UN, 2015). In addition, almost all opinions support and call for finding a concrete and immediate solution for it. In this sense, many scholars and researchers tackled the issue almost in the same manner of highlighting the danger of the phenomenon and the necessity of combating it. Other perspectives concentrated on highlighting its negative impacts that are reflected on the economic situations for some countries.

The settlements which poor people build in cities and urban areas are often referred to and defined as "informal settlements" (Pieterse, 2011). This is because they are usually constructed without formal government decisions or normal legal processes. Slums are considered a phenomenon that is regularly associated with the fast growing urbanization process that took place in most developing countries throughout the past four decades, and of course Egypt is one of those countries (Abdelhalim, 2014). Consequently, governments face serious challenges in confronting this rapid shift of living in cities rather than in rural areas (Runkel, 2009). The need to provide houses to an increasing number of inhabitants results in offering insufficient adequate housing options leaving a great number of inhabitants with no option other than living with no formal permissions in informal areas. Informality, on a wider scope, can be referred to as a cultural phenomenon stemmed from the lack of the rule of law and rampant corruption on the part of urban management (Abdelhalim, 2014).

In addition, the common fact that slums or informal settlements exist in most cities of developing countries, providing a sort of informality in housing delivery mechanism, has been a critical challenge to economic growth (Debraj Roy, 2014). This is best exemplified in many cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and fortunately, many of the cities in these areas succeeded to overcome the slums problem.

Spatial Inequality

Spatial inequality is very common and evident in the Egyptian context. In many areas quality of life and the level of basic services vary significantly from one place to another. This is evident in the fact that the provision of basic infrastructure, sanitation, quality of hospitals, school performance, employment opportunities, the quality of air and even the standard of clean water can drastically differ from one place to another. The degree of spatial inequality increases in Cairo since poor services and infrastructure together with poverty are actually prevalent in some areas, limiting economic and social flexibility (Lobao, 2002). In contrast, the concept of

spatial justice means guaranteeing equivalent access to public services, including education, medical treatment and job opportunities. Spatial justice is not only improving the quantity of public services in a certain area but also improving the quality (Tadamun, 2015).

In Egypt, on the local community level, the deficiency of planning tools is clear since the actual needs of people are not transparently reflected, and hence many forms of deprivation remain unseen. Whether an area is labeled as "unplanned" or "unsafe" is not enough, spatial inequality is evident in the fact that there are planned and safe areas, yet lack basic services or characterized by urban deterioration. In addition, on the different ministries fiscal planning part, budgets are distributed to directorates in the different governorates, without a monitoring system to control the distribution of those funds at the lower administrative part. Local development programs on the district level use a very small proportion of public funds. (Tadamun, 2015). The gap between local development needs and the unfair amount of government investments for those areas, compared to its own investments in formal districts, reflects the lack of effective designing ways for measuring and visualizing the distribution of financial funds among urban areas.

Poverty

In most cities, there is a direct two-directional relationship between poverty and deterioration of the environment which is usually reflected in the slum areas of those cities. Lack of infrastructure, poor drainage and absence of waste disposal systems are common features in many streets in Cairo (Araby, 2002). Disparities between the areas with adequate and inadequate services and infrastructure are obvious. Cairo suffered from high rates of urbanization due to the increased number of rural migrants coming to the city and due to the lack of legal land for housing and infrastructure which contributed to the creation of informal housing. This maximized the number of poor people taking illegal lands as well as improper forms of housing as their permanent houses.

Increased poverty together with fast urbanization and widening social divide are some reasons behind slum formation in previous years. This resulted in degrading the environmental conditions and had some negative consequences on the health conditions of residents (Arnott, 2009). According to a survey conducted by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) in 2015 addressing income and expenditures, about 27.8% of the Egyptian population is currently living below the poverty line (CAPMAS, 2015). This high rate of poverty has contributed to the prevalence of informal settlements, particularly absolute poverty. In the other direction, slum conditions perpetuate the poverty of Egyptians living in them.

The Right to Housing

Every citizen has the right to live in an adequate shelter where he/she enjoys security, peace, and dignity in a healthy environment. According to a report by UN-Habitat on the challenge of slums in 2003, this shelter should include protection against arbitrary destruction or forced evictions. People should have the freedom to choose where to live and to move freely from one place to another. This right also includes entitlements to security of tenure and participation in the decision-making process related to housing issues at all levels of government. Most national constitutions safeguard the right to housing, but reserve the right of the state to control the right to property and may evict individuals of their property as long as it is not arbitrary or if this serves the public need. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights mentions the right to property in Article 17, which states that "Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." (Pieterse, 2011).

As for Egypt, Article number seventy eight of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution guarantees the right to housing. It reads as follows:

"The State shall ensure the citizens' right to adequate, safe and healthy housing in a manner which preserves human dignity and achieves social justice. The State shall devise

a national housing plan which upholds the environmental particularity and ensures the contribution of personal and collaborative initiatives in its implementation. The State shall also regulate the use of State lands and provide them with basic utilities within the framework of comprehensive urban planning which serves cities and villages and a population distribution strategy. This is to be applied in a manner serving the public interest, improving the quality of life for citizens and safeguards the rights of future generations. The State shall also devise a comprehensive national plan to address the problem of unplanned slums, which includes re-planning, provision of infrastructure and utilities, and improvement of the quality of life and public health. In addition, the State shall guarantee the provision of resources necessary for implementing such plan within a specified period of time." (Egypt's Constitution of 2014, 2016).

Nevertheless, secure tenure is not guaranteed for almost 44% of Egypt's population who do not enjoy clear legal tenure. This has caused many vulnerable residents to become victims of forced evictions. In the period between 2011 and 2013, more than 21 forced evictions were implemented without fair compensation to thousands of evictees. This was shown in 2014 when the riot police with instructions from Cairo Governorate, without earlier notice or consultation, demolished the houses of around 1,000 families in Ezbet el-Nakhl. Some of the inhabitants were re-housed, while many others became homeless (Amnesty, 2011).

The right to housing is also affected by the continuingly widening gap between income and house prices. Whereas house prices and rents keep increasing, incomes for poor and extremely poor households have either remained stagnant or decreased (CAPMAS, 2013). The lack of State control over commodification of land and real estate is a major factor for this dilemma. In addition, since the Ministry of Housing (MoH) controls a large land bank for urban development, it thus controls real estate prices to its advantage. In spite of the fact that the Ministry of Housing proclaims that a portion of these incomes is dedicated for funding low-

income housing, yet the provided housing programs have not benefited the poor for several years. Inflation of land prices is also a direct result of the fact that some governmental agencies own large land banks and manipulate policies for their own benefit. Thus, demand for adequate affordable housing continues to overpass supply since Egypt fails to regulate the real estate market and implement a pro poor housing policy. In absence of a policy directing public and private investments towards affordable housing, the higher income segments benefit most of such investments (Sims, 2008).

Chapter Four: International Experiences

In-Situ Redevelopment

Rio De Janeiro, Brazil

The history of slums in the city of **Rio de Janeiro** in **Brazil** summarizes an industrial and infrastructure development story (UN-Habitat, 2003). The existence of slums, known as "favelas", was basically due to urbanization together with high fertility rates. This has resulted in the displacement of the poor who had no other chance but resorting to collective efforts for constructing cheap housing away from the city. The lack of affordable and reasonable housing and a transportation system increased the further spread of those slums all around the city (Magalhães, 2012).

By the 1970s, it was announced that 13 per cent of the city inhabitants lived in slums. Under several military dictatorships 100,000 slum dwellers were evicted within a period of two to three years (Perlman, 2004). It is worth mentioning that the housing policy in Brazil did not involve the federal government and functions at the sub-national level. Prior to the 1990s, state-level policies served informal settlements in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Then, a decentralization trend was introduced through the 1988 constitution. During the 1990s, the city of Rio de Janeiro worked on including informal settlements into the city's public services and started the process of legitimizing the existence of informal settlements. Hence, favelas became legitimate communities (Soares, 2005). They significantly grew to the extent that around 25% of the population lived in slums, yet exclusion increased. During the 1990s, the government, in response, developed a new municipal housing policy. However, the socio-spatial segregation of the city of Rio and its dwellers continued to increase ((IDB), 2004).

Like many other Brazilian cities, the city of Rio de Janeiro suffered from a serious informal urbanization, which in turn resulted in the rise of favelas that became a reality and an irreversible process at the same time. Despite the previous measures taken by the public

authorities to halt the expansion of slums by eradication or relocation of families to other locations far from the city, such efforts did not succeed or present a viable solution (Magalhães, 2012)

In response to the increase of slums, the Brazilian government implemented a number of significant slum programs (UN-Habitat, 2003). One of these programs was the Urbanization Program for Popular Settlements in Rio de Janeiro (Favela Bairro). Favela Bairro aimed at incorporating slums within the city by facilitating access to basic urban and social services (Castro, 2009). Total amount of the project was US$300 million, an amount of US$180 million was received as loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and an amount of US$120 million was received in the form of co-finance from the local government of Rio de Janeiro.

Actors of the Favela Bairro

The project was collaboration between the (IDB) and the national government. At the beginning, IDB managed the policy and slum upgrading was the main concern. Nevertheless, after the inauguration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the Municipal Housing Department became the leader of the project (Fiori, 2000).

In June 1992, the Brazilian government issued a Complementary Law that initiated a Regulatory Plan for the city of Rio de Janeiro (Magalhães, 2012). Besides, the GEAP (Grupo Executivo de Assentamentos Populares, Popular Settlements Executive Group) which included eight departments and seven municipal bodies of Rio de Janeiro was established to develop serious actions to restrain urban decline. In 1994, the project Favela Bairro was launched with funds from the Office of the Mayor. Besides, an additional loan of US$180 million was received in December 1995. By these resources accompanied by US$120 million, the Popular Settlements Urbanization Program was established (Programa de Urbanizacao de Assentamentos Populares, or PROAP II). This succeeded in financing a considerable extension of Favela Bairro to reach 54

slum areas. The program also integrated basic infrastructure works in eight informal lot divisions.

The basic infrastructure components of the project included water supply, sanitary systems and illumination equipment and road pavements. Access to this infrastructure was accomplished with the help of local and central agencies (Soares, 2005).

The social component of the program developed and included establishing early day care centers. Besides, training and community activities were added, as well as specific modalities that included the formation of agentes comunitarios: members of the slum area or favela who received training in issues of community development, cleanliness and sanitization, and in other areas of the program. In addition, during the second phase of the program, more favelas were selected and a property titling program, that was initially planned for, started implementation (Soares, 2005).

Favela Bairro was targeting medium-sized communities, however, unfortunately, populations with high urbanization costs were not included. The government also executed other programs addressing smaller sizes of slums along with programs to urbanize largest favela communities (Perlman, 2004).

In order to fill this gap and target larger informal settlements, the Growth Acceleration Program, a program which focused on infrastructure, was launched in 2007. The program was considered a strategic investment which incorporates management initiatives together with public works. The main focus of the program was investing in energy, logistics and social development. The budget of the project in its first phase was US$306 billion and it lasted from 2007 to 2010 (Magalhães, 2012).

Favela Bairro Objective

The main objective of the program was enhancing the standard of life of the poor population existing in favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro by investing in infrastructure and

conducting social development actions. The program consisted of four modules: serving children and teenagers, providing job opportunities, institutional improvement which to apply a monitoring and evaluation comprehensive system, together with training for officials in the Mayor's office, training of workers and civil society organizations, and finally actions for disseminating information about the program to the community.

The program's objectives are listed below:

- Improving the standard of life of poor inhabitants living in slums and irregular settlements in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Magalhães, 2012). This was done by reaching 56,000 families in 52 slums and 17 irregular settlements that used to have no access to the main services.

  o Providing basic sanitation.

  o Street paving and public lighting.

  o Eliminating the major geological risks in 100 percent of slums.

  o Allowing a participatory approach for the community to participate in the planning and execution phases.

  o Providing educational campaigns in support of the planned projects, environmental conservation and protection, maintenance of the sanitary and other infrastructure.

  o Land-titling regularization.

- Serving children and teenagers.

- Providing employment and facilitating income generation

- Institutional Improvement ((IDB), 2004).

Below are the exact program's objectives with the accomplishments:

Planned Objective	Accomplished Objectives
Module 1 (Urban Infrastructure) - Integrated Urbanization	
By the end of the project, objective was to reach 56,000 families in 52 slum areas and 17 irregular settlements that used to have no access to the basic services.	75,796 families were reached in 62 slum areas and 16 informal settlements.
(a) Infrastructure	**(a) Infrastructure**
(i) Providing sewage system:	**(i) Providing sewage system:**
• 100 percent of dwellers should be served with access to potable water, a pluvial drainage net as well as a sanitary system.	• 96 percent of dwellers had access to potable water and 90 percent had sanitary services.
(ii) Street paving and illumination:	**(ii) Street paving and illumination:**
• Paving 100 percent of the central streets and 80 percent of the adjacent ones; • Providing public lighting to 100 percent of the central streets, and 60 percent of the adjacent ones. • Establishing 11,132 lighting points.	• 9,890 lighting points were established and properly functioning.
(iii) Geological risks:	**(iii) Geological risks:**
• Eradicate or alleviate the major geological risks in 100 percent of slums.	• 100 percent of risks were eradicated or alleviated in the urbanized area.
(iv) Social equipment:	**(iv) Social equipment:**
• Each favela or informal settlement must	• All favelas had at least one daycare center

have at least one daycare center or any another form of child care from infancy to four years as well as one recreational area.

- To establish 49 daycare centers and 69 sports areas.

(b) Community development

(i) Community participation

- 100 percent of households in every slum area or informal settlement should be reached and invited to participate in the different activities of the program by taking part in at least one of the meetings and any other community activity.

(ii) Providing educational campaigns in support of the planned projects, environmental conservation and protection, maintenance of the sanitary and other infrastructure.

(c) Land-titling regularization:

- Six months after the works were done, all dwellers should have security of tenure.

in addition to a sports area.

- 39 daycare centers and 51 sports areas were established.

(b) Community development

(i) Community participation

- Slum dwellers actively participated in all the stages of the project.

(ii) Providing educational campaigns in support of the planned projects, environmental conservation and protection, maintenance of the sanitary and other infrastructure.

- Slum dwellers were satisfied by the level of maintenance after concluding the program.

(c) Land-titling regularization:

- Goal accomplished

Estimated Cost:	Actual Cost:
US$422 million	US$424.661 million

Module 2 (Social Action) - Serving Children and Teenagers

(a) Serving children from birth to 4 years old • Nurseries: only 8,400 children received service by nurseries, which constituted 30 percent of the targeted number for a proper dietary as well as psychosocial service.	**(a) Serving children from birth to 4 Years old** • Nurseries: Goal surpassed: 8,589 children received service; all nurseries equipped with competent personnel, proper circumstances for dietary and psychosocial service were accomplished.
(b) Serving children between 7 to 14 • Retaining students and education reinforcement: 2,750 children and teenagers should be retained in schools and their school performance should be improved. • Providing guidance and support to youth from 15 to 17 years via implementing community programs.	**(b) Serving children between 7 and 14** • Retaining students and education reinforcement: 2,750 children were retained in school and 1,658 were prepared. • A total of 4,128 youth attended the community programs and received the intended guidance and support.
(c) Support for groups in high-risk situations: • The program should care for at least 50 percent *of teenagers and children in high-risk situations* acknowledged in each community.	**(c) Support for groups in high-risk situations:** • 86,179 places were created to care for children and teenagers in high-risk situations

• Special attention should be paid for at least 50 percent of *children with disabilities* and integrating them into the community and social life. • At least 70 percent of the women registered in the program should be trained as "guardians" for their children against social exclusion.	• 100 percent of disabled children were taken care of and integrated into social life. • Achieved and surpassed: 96 percent of registered women were trained and received an authorization to act as "guardians" for their children and the community against social exclusion.
Estimated Cost: US$25.5 million	**Actual Cost:** US$19.231 million
Module 3 - Providing Employment Opportunities	
(a) Specialized training • 16,442 workers and 80 percent of students should be trained in fifteen training fields. • 2,100 specialists should receive practical assistance and training. **(b) Increasing educational services:** • 4,400 workers should complete the complementary programs offered by school and should receive their diplomas and certificates.	**(a) Specialized training** • 38,500 students and workers received training in different fields. • Goal achieved and exceeded: 2,889 specialists were trained. **(b) Increasing educational services:** • 13,319 individuals were assisted by the project and 5,215 got graduated.
Estimated Cost: US$9 million	**Actual Cost:** US$9.476 million

Module 4 – Institutional Development	
(a) Monitoring and evaluation: • Six months after concluding the work, an investigation should be implemented.	**(a) Monitoring and evaluation:** • Achieved: a computerized system was created and a research was applied in 38 communities in 2004/2005.
(b) Technical assistance • 100 officials should be trained in implementation and management of social projects and applied engineering. • Management methods should be introduced and control systems of its decentralized activities should be implemented	**(b) Technical assistance** • Goal achieved and surpassed: 100 officials were trained in the Mayor's office and 764 technicians received the required training.
(c) Social communication: • Producing and distributing videos, posters media ads and didactic materials for disseminating information about the program.	**(c) Social communication:** • 11 educational videos and DVDs were produced, 30,000 brochures. Besides, 3,000 books as well as a weekly publication reaching one million people in Rio de Janeiro were distributed.
Estimated Cost: US$4.5 million	**Actual Cost:** US$5.19 million

Table 1: Favela Bairro Planned and Accomplished Objectives (Magalhães, 2012)

Favela Bairro Implementation

Resident associations were the liaison between departments of public housing and architects. The second phase of the program witnessed the initiation of social programs such as

child care centers, community development, training and hygiene. Moreover, in 1997, the Municipal Employment Department was established to co-ordinate programs such as training, employment and income generation. Implementation was led by Secretaria Municipal de Habitação (SMH) in cooperation with other sectors. Over time, the involved sectors started to shift their priorities as per the corresponding circumstances. Additionally, NGOs were involved to run community service centers and other social projects. Finally, the private sector was assigned the work of housing construction and infrastructure (Perlman, 2004).

Favela Bairro Impacts

Most of the goals were achieved during the first phase of the project. Over 90% of activities and 284 public works and other projects, were accomplished in the target favelas (Magalhães, 2012). Interventions were made in 38 of the targeted 54 favelas. Three main outputs were within the framework of the project: water access including connection to sewers, paved streets and establishment of nurseries. An analysis by income revealed that the areas with the poorest population benefitted from access to potable water, sanitary and rubbish collection, whereas the areas with richer population only did to a lesser extent (Soares, 2005).

The following table indicates degree of satisfaction regarding main improvements in services for slum areas which were served by the Favela Bairro program and those which were not served by the program:

	Sewage	Garbage Collection	Public Lighting	Drainage	Street Network
Favela Bairro	80%	87%	73%	73%	80%
Non-Participating in Favela Bairro	40%	35%	35%	22%	12%

Table 2: Satisfaction with Main Services:

Comparison: Areas Served by Favela Bairro and Others Not Served by the Program (TULIER, 2011)

Favela Bairro Factors of Success

In 1988, Brazil included a section on urban policy in their constitution to become the first country in the world to do so. The section included two articles only: the first one recognized the function of property and the other article recognized the rights of the land owner. Labor unions and civil society had a great role to play in the issuance of these articles (Fernandes, 2010).

It is worth mentioning that in the following decades, local governments in Brazil became independent of the central government making more democratic decisions and were notably capable to develop and carry out projects addressing the needs of the city. This decentralization of government together with prioritizing urban equity made the Brazilian cities more like an incubator for urban improvement (Fiori, 2000).

Besides, Favela Bairro had set explicit principles for the community's involvement in the decision making associated with infrastructure interventions (Magalhães, 2012). The program was elaborately discussed with the community from the beginning. For the sake of mobilizing the population and mediating in the case of conflicts, local representatives were recruited. At first, community involvement in decision making of infrastructure upgrading was not formalized. Thus, special sessions were developed to formalize the process.

In addition, a constructive element of success in Favela Bairro was promoting continuous training of technical staff. This also led to spreading the needed knowledge to enable replication of the experience in future programs. It was noted that the commitment to the settlements of this trained staff increased during program implementation. Even though some of these staff left their positions in the program due to changes in the government, yet they joined other governmental agencies in different municipalities to expand the process of knowledge sharing and information dissemination (TULIER, 2011).

As for the level of political and institutional commitment, there was a full municipal government commitment represented in dedicating a big portion of the budget of Rio de Janeiro to the Housing Department and granting it a central role. Moreover, Favela Bairro enjoyed successful intersectoral practices which involved the departments of health, labor, education and social development as well as public companies such as the State Water and Sewer Company, the Urban Cleaning Company and Rio de Janeiro's Municipal Urbanization Company (Magalhães, 2012).

The experience of Favela Bairro is useful in the sense that the project was not built on a set institutional structure; it was the outcome of a public housing policy, which in turn established the Municipal Housing Department that implemented the project. Architects, engineers, and other professionals who had enough experience in public works in informal settlements, were hired by the department. This participation of external personnel, chosen based on merit and qualifications, provided innovative ways to solve problems by integrating different methods and experiences (Fiori, 2000).

Nairobi, Kenya

Another good example of slum upgrading is the city of **Nairobi** in Kenya. Like many other developing countries, Kenya has witnessed a huge increase in urban population over the past five decades (Muraguri, 2012). The challenge posed on the government in this respect was great and they failed to provide essential services of housing, health and education. Consequently, more urban dwellers in Kenya, especially Nairobi, lived in overcrowded slums that lack fundamental facilities to maintain a minimum standard of living. In Nairobi, for instance, the growth of slums was unprecedented; 60 percent of the population, occupied 5 percent only of the total land area and lived in informal settlements (Syrjänen, 2008). Furthermore, water was not available except for only 22 percent of the slum population in Nairobi, most of them suffered from the high prices imposed on them by manipulative vendors (UN-Habitat, 2006). They also suffered from poor and insufficient sanitary services which led to many health problems and diseases.

The government of Kenya, as a response, implemented several initiatives to address the issue of slums (UN-Habitat, 2003). They established a number of institutions among which are the Nairobi Informal Settlements Coordination Committee and the Local Authority Transfer Fund. These institutions focused on providing improved access to services, settlement upgrading and community participation. The positive outcomes of these initiatives are basically expanded community participation and opportunities and an increased housing stock (Syrjänen, 2008)

Since the 1970's, with the emergence of excessive worldwide concerns with slum conditions and the call for slum-free cities, the Kenyan government was urged to find solutions responding to slums prevalence. Over the span of time, the government of Kenya implemented several housing development policies and strategies, such as resettlement, forced eviction, site and services development and upgrading (UN-Habitat, 2008). Forced eviction was the prevailing practice of slum demolition until 2000. When the Millennium Development Goals, which stressed the necessity of slum upgrading, were adopted by UN member countries, Kenya began

shifting its approach to slum upgrading. In 2003, the government of Kenya and UN-HABITAT signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by which UN-HABITAT should manage the Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP), starting with Kibera, Nairobi's largest slum. As per a statement by the government of Kenya, the objective of KENSUP was to "have improved the livelihoods of at least 5.3 million urban Slum dwellers (1.6 million households) by the year 2020 at an estimated cost of Kshs 884 billion or $13 billion" (Muraguri, 2012). As for funding, the project received USD 240,000 from Cities Alliance and USD 110,000 from UN-HABITAT. The project's contribution partners were the Nairobi City Council, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Roads and Public Works, and Ministry of Cooperatives (Muraguri, 2012).

According to the MoU of the project, the role of UN-HABITAT was to provide technical guidance through consultants from the UN, provide the needed support in the infrastructure work and manage a proper utilization of the program's funds. For example, UN-Habitat worked as a liaison with donor agencies and worked closely with the government of Kenya to create a Slum Upgrading Fund to provide low cost housing. The government of Kenya was responsible for providing training, equipment, supplies and material (UN-Habitat, 2006).

In 2008, the Kenya Vision 2030 was launched outlining the country's plan for development until 2030. The key objective of this vision was providing improved access to affordable housing. (Kenya Vision 2030 , 2007). This was also documented in the new constitution which was adopted by Kenya to guarantee all citizens the right to adequate housing and sound standards of sanitation. In order to make this happen, the government worked in cooperation with some international institutions, particularly the World Bank. Accordingly, loans were facilitated to start another slum upgrading program—the Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Program (KISIP)—parallel to KENSUP and which was developed in 2011 targeting 15 cities including Nairobi. Funds were granted by the World Bank and other international agencies (Syrjänen, 2008).

KENSUP and KISIP Content, Scope and Implementation

KISIP had five years plan, from 2011-2016, aiming at providing infrastructure and securing land tenure in 15 cities, whereas KENSUP had a 20 years plan, 2005-2025, aiming at providing affordable housing and community participation. The following table shows the main scope of each program:

PROGRAM	KISIP	KENSUP
Scope	- Five-year project (2011-2016) - Strengthening infrastructure - Participatory urban planning - Strengthening main institutions of urban management	- Long-term project (2005-2020) - Housing/shelter improvement - Provision of physical and social infrastructure/ amenities - Community mobilization and participation

Table 3: KISIP and KENSUP Main Scope of Work (Syrjänen, 2008)

KENSUP and KISIP were concurrently implemented by the Ministry of Housing (MoH) and local authorities. KISIP was managed by the Ministry of Housing that was responsible for overall program coordination, program design, procurement, financial management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), as well as reporting. As for KENSUP, it was managed by the Ministry of Housing together with the Department of Slum Upgrading established under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing (Anderson, 2015).

The Slum Upgrading Fund was established by GoK and UN-HABITAT to serve as a pool for the funding of slum upgrading programs and KENSUP was one of them. UN-HABITAT provided the initial funding with subsequent financial support from the National Budget. On the other hand, 60% of KISIP's funding came from the World Bank, 30% from SIDA and AFD and 10% from the Kenyan government (UN-Habitat, 2006).

Starting 2013, KENSUP focused on Kenya's four largest cities in terms of population: Nairobi, Mavoko Mombasa and Kisumu. In Nairobi, the project covered housing, Infrastructure

and social services; in Mavoko, the project targeted housing and infrastructure; in Mombasa and Kisumu, the program focused on social services such as schools, markets, and health facilities (UN-Habitat, 2006). The selection criteria of cities were comprehensive and detailed. It included a number of considerations such as status of land tenure, location of settlement, size of settlements, proximity to trunk infrastructure and community willingness to take part (Anderson, 2015).

KENSUP and KISIP Outcomes

The following achievements have been made:

KENSUP	KISIP
- Socio-economic mapping - Master plan for Kibera was developed - Creation of Settlement Executive Committees in two villages in Kibera - Construction works for 405 units in Mavoko - Establishment of schools, clinics, water & sanitation facilities.	- Institutional strengthening has been implemented in the 15 cities - Land tenure - Provision of infrastructure

Table 4: KENSUP and KISIP Outcomes

KENSUP and KISIP Factors of Success

Both programs enjoyed actual government support financially and in terms of providing the needed personnel. On the one hand, KENSUP was legally formalized by establishing a Slum Development Department under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing. Within the program, a Slum Upgrading Fund, which dedicated around $13 billion to implement the program, was created. In addition, KENSUP was financed through funds from the national budget. On the other hand, the KISIP project also received a loan from the World Bank, amounted to $165 million.

Another key factor of success was the integration of community participation into the project policy. Besides, KENSUP used housing cooperatives as a tool for community mobilization. The Ministry of Cooperative Development and Management formed a number of cooperatives in both Mavoko and Kibera together with other four housing cooperatives that were already formed and registered in Soweto, Kibera and five in Mavoko. Facilitation in the formation of Housing Cooperatives Society and community groups in slums is considered an achievement in itself. Housing cooperative societies were recognized as the best mechanism for participation in upgrading projects (Muraguri, 2012).

Another success element is that both programs were established on collaboration. KENSUP involved the cooperation of GoK and UN-HABITAT while KISIP involved the collaboration of the World Bank and was executed by GoK (UN-Habitat, 2006). The collaborative nature of the projects drew upon the expertise of each partner to achieve successful implementation. Such partnership models are considered examples of how to design institutional strategies to meet the MDG challenge of providing safe and affordable livelihood specifically to slum communities.

The key principles of KENSUP were decentralization, democratization, sustainability, transparency, accountability, empowerment, resource mobilization, secure tenure, expansion, partnerships and networking.

As for the institutional set-up of the project, the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) consisting of slum dwellers. Since the government's main concern was dissemination of information and decisions concerning the program, SEC was the main driver of this program. Other institutional aspects of KENSUP included the: Programme Secretariat (in the Ministry), Settlement Project Implementation Unit, Project Implementation Unit and the Interagency Steering Committee (IASC), Local Authorities and UN-HABITAT (Muraguri, 2012).

Codi, Thailand

Moving to another international experience to set role models in the issue of successful dealings with slums, the research will present the case of **Codi**, Thailand. In the 1970s Thailand's cities witnessed a huge increase in the population of informal settlements. In the early 1980s, it was estimated that 24% of Bangkok's population lived in informal settlements (NADKARNY, 2010). The response of municipal governments in Thailand during the 1970s to this increase of informal settlements was usually eviction and demolition without guaranteeing resettlement. In response, a number of civil society and community organizations mobilized to reject evictions. Accordingly, a program to resettle inhabitants of informal settlements into apartment housing on the cities suburbs was initiated in the 1980s by the National Housing Authority (NHA). However, the lack of employment opportunities in such locations caused many families to return to the informal settlements. In this respect, community organizations started experimenting participatory models of upgrading which were funded through savings groups. Such community savings groups were created in the late 1980s and were connected through networks which had enough information about financing schemes and upgrading methods. Some of these savings groups were financed by UNICEF through small revolving loan funds (Boonyabancha, 2005).

Apart from the NHA's upgrading program, some pilot housing initiatives were introduced for the poor. This involved "land-sharing" programs, through which residents received infrastructure and secure tenure. This was when they negotiated sharing the site they have been occupying with the landowner. In 1992, the government of Thailand established the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO), to provide the needed support to community organizations in terms of granting loans for new housing, settlement improvements, and income generation. In 2000, there was a merge between UCDO and the Rural Development Fund forming the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI) for the sake of implementing upgrading housing programs. In 2003, two new upgrading programs were

announced by the government aiming at providing secure housing to one million poor households. The first project was the Baan Mankong (*"secure housing"*) Program, which dedicated government funds and soft loans to community organizations of the urban poor that plan and implement improvements to their lands, houses, environment as well as basic services. This program has been implemented by CODI. The second project was the Baan Ua Arthorn (*"We care"*) Program which was implemented with a different perspective. The National Housing Authority carried out the designs, implemented the construction works and offered flats for sale at subsidized prices to the residents who can pay US$ 25 – 37 per month. (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).

The Baan Mankong project was basically initiated to support the existing low-income communities and organizations for managing and implementing upgrading processes. This was in cooperation with local governments, experts, universities and NGOs to survey the low-income communities in a certain city, plan and implement an upgrading program which in turn would resolve the land and housing problems in this city within three or four years. Upon the conclusion of these upgrading plans, CODI directed the infrastructure subsidies and housing loans to the communities, who carried out the work all by themselves (Boonyabancha, 2005).

The Baan Mankong built upon the capacity of the community to meet their own needs. No specific formula for upgrading was stipulated by the upgrading program; it was open for all possible options as per the agreement between the owner of the land, people and other development organizations. When resettlement was inevitable, alternative locations were suggested to the communities provided that they should be near their original locations, to reduce the social and economic costs of resettlement. Communities owned power over all the decisions of the upgrading project and took accountability, to repay loans. The main objective of the Baan Mankong program was improving housing and living conditions and providing security of tenure for poor households, in poor communities in Thailand, within a time frame of five years

(NADKARNY, 2010). One of the main strong points of this program was imposing the least possible conditions, to allow poor communities and different stakeholders, in each city, the maximum freedom to design their upgrading program as per their needs. The whole project was characterized by flexibility which was shown in using flexible financial management and allowing communities the required flexibility on the ground, contrasting with the usual conventional contracting and driven methods (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).

Baan Mankong Content, Scope and Implementation

The first stage of establishing the Baan Mankong Program was identifying the relevant stakeholders and clarifying the project in detail to ensure that the nature of the finance initiative is clearly conveyed. The second stage was organizing community meetings so that the stakeholders start taking ownership of the program and establishing a joint committee for overseeing the implementation of the program. This committee involved the urban low-income community, social leaders, local officials, academics and NGOs. The committee worked on building new co-operation relationships and creating a mechanism to plan and implement housing development initiatives. Once the committee was established, a city meeting was to be held with delegates from all communities to disseminate the required information about the upgrading project and the preparation process (Boonyabancha, 2005).

The process usually started by gathering information on all households, infrastructure problems, land ownership and housing security through a survey that the committee organized. Using the technique of surveying people's needs provided an opportunity for people to gather and learn about the problems of each other. The gathered information was used to set a development plan that covered all the slum areas in Thailand. In the meantime, loan groups and collective community savings were created to run funds within the community and to support community groups (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).

Upon the completion of work preparation, pilot projects were selected and determined according to needs and communities' willingness to participate. These projects were later on referred to as "learning centers" for other communities (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).

With the pilot projects successfully completed, they may be replicated as an example to other groups. Necessary was been taken to involve the homeless and urban low-income families who did not live in the communities. In this respect, the projects were incorporated into the housing development process of the city. Such a transition necessitated coordination for integrating the community-built infrastructure into larger public service networks. During the process, it was fundamental to create job opportunities for the poor and to learn from the success factors between the population by exchanging visits with government staff and community delegates (Boonyabancha, 2005).

As for the financial part of the Baan Mankong Program, the infrastructure subsidy per-household had a ceiling of US$625 per family for in situ upgrading, and a ceiling of US$ 1,625 per family for families moving to another place. Once the total subsidy for each community was calculated, this allowed different groups to discuss, share, plan and budget for implementation. With the help of CODI, the Program also provided soft loans for building houses or buying land. In addition, the program facilitated the process of receiving a grant to help in funding the costs of local management and support the organizational process and networking. Securing land tenure terms were negotiated on an individual basis to offer a variety of options. Moreover, this was conducted locally, with minimal involvement of national entities. The emphasis was on collective, rather than individual land tenure (165 Cities in Asia, 2012).

In 2003, for the sake of exploring different upgrading practices, ten pilot projects were executed. In the next few lines, four cases will be presented.

The first project was land purchase and was implemented in the city of Charoenchai Nimitmai which comprised 81 households living on a very small area in Bangkok, surrounded by

an expressway, railway and a sewerage canal. The residents of this community used to rent their land for many years. In 1998, they offered to buy the land, after being threatened with eviction. A cooperative was established and people received a CODI loan to buy it. Most residents constructed their homes via materials from their existing houses. The people succeeded by negotiations with different local departments to bring electricity, water provision as well as building permits. In the meantime, a contractor was appointed for the works which required heavy equipment, but the residents managed other structure work themselves, hiring paid individuals as labor to minimize upgrading costs by 30%. Each household costed US$ 6,683 in average, which included $1,126 for housing, US$500 for infrastructure and the rest for purchasing the land. In return, each household made housing and land repayments between US$27 and $50 on a monthly basis (Boonyabancha, 2005).

The second project was launched responding to a harm caused by fire in the city of Bon Kai, a community of 566 households in central Bangkok, which was exposed to a fire that demolished 200 houses. Accordingly, the people of Bon Kai used this calamity to establish a cooperative and bargain for a 30-year land lease subject for renewal. The reconstruction works were set in three stages in order to avoid displacement of people even for some time. For the sake of accommodating all households, three-storey row houses of only 24 square meters were built (NADKARNY, 2010).

In the third program, a number of communities joined together for the sake of upgrading their houses collectively. In an area called Ramkhamhaeng, two primary upgrading programs took place carrying out a large upgrading process which included seven communities in the same neighborhood. The first project was a slum rea which consisted of 124 families, inhabiting a large space of land. The program entailed creating a cooperative and the people succeeded in gaining a 30-year lease. In addition, the people worked closely with professionals to create a new design for their community. As for the second project, it included 34 families residing on a site

that belonged to the state. Their first plan was to renovate and reconstruct their houses in the same site, but the costs of filling the land were very expensive. Other groups found the project useful to their cases and managed to join these two programs. They worked very closely with the local government and prepared a redevelopment plan which provided secure land and housing for around 1,000 families in several areas. This redevelopment plan helped in creating new housing areas connected to markets and parks. Eventually everyone remained in the general area with long term leases obtained through community cooperatives (UN-Habitat, 2009).

In the fourth project, scattered slum areas were consolidated into a new community enjoying leases for long-term periods. 124 families that were residing in small slum areas were relocated to the new settlement, Boon Kook, in the northern city of Uttaradit. This was accomplished through forming a cooperative to which the municipality agreed to lease a piece of land for 30 years, with a small annual rent. In addition, the residents initiated daily savings schemes among themselves, the NHA helped in the infrastructure works and CODI offered housing loans.

Baan Mankong Factors of Success

Unlike traditional projects, urban poor communities were the main players in this housing upgrading program. This was evident in the fact that the communities controlled the funding, managed the projects and implemented the improvements. Moreover, they carried out the work in most of the construction works and did not hire contractors, which led to minimize the cost to help in the additional investments people made in their own residences. This allowed the program to be driven by people's needs rather than being led by contractors or government. One of the main success factors was that the program supported only communities that were ready and keen to take part and implement their own improvement projects and allowed responses. This flexibility allowed the people to choose how to make use of their allocated infrastructure subsidy, and select the piece of land for purchasing or rental, etc. In addition, the program did

not stipulate or instruct any standard outputs, but rather provided flexible funding which allowed the people to plan, execute and accomplish the upgrading process as per their needs. However for the sake of accuracy, an architect was present during the process of housing planning. The projects also led to the enhancement of community development funds, subsidized housing and community welfare systems. What also helped in the success of this program were the strength that the community managerial systems developed and the confidence they gained in local government and other involved actors in the city. The poor people were accepted as legitimate members and valuable partners of their cities when their own upgrading plans and contributions were integrated into the city's larger development plans and strategy.

Summary of the success factors of the in situ development cases

After demonstrating three global experiences in in situ slum development, below is a

summary of their success factors:

Factors of Success	Brazilian Experience Rio de Janeiro	Kenyan Experience	Thai Experience
Community Participation	-Community consultation in the decision making concerning infrastructure interventions. -Careful discussion with the community from the beginning of the program. -Hiring local representatives to involve the population and mediate in case of any conflicts. -Workshops were introduced to structure the process of decision making.	- KENSUP used housing cooperatives as a tool for community mobilization. - Housing cooperative societies were recognized as the best strategy for participation and transfer of ownership to the people in upgrading projects	- Communities controlled the funding, managed the projects and implemented the improvements. - Communities carried out the work in most of the building works all by themselves, rather than contractors.
Budget Allocation	-Full municipal government commitment reflected in the granting funds from the budget of the city to the Housing Department and allowing it to play a central role. -Total amount of the project was US$300 million.	- KISIP and KENSUP enjoyed actual government support by providing the needed funds and personnel. - Around $13 billion and other allocations from the national budget were dedicated for the full implementation of KENSUP. - $165 million was received from the World Bank for the implementation of KISIP.	- Baan Mankong received the following financial support: - Annual grants from the government to subsidize investments in infrastructure and services. - Payments from community members which was facilitated by economic growth increasing from 5.9% in 1990 to 6.8% in 2010 which in turn has increased poor people's loan-repayment capacity. - For the sake of channeling money quickly and directly to the community, and taking into consideration the fact that CODI was a separate and independent public institution, it could avoid the limitations of bureaucracy by applying

			directly to the government budget instead of having to address a ministry in advance.
Institutional Set-Up	- No particular institutional structure was imposed; the Municipal Housing Department was established to carry out the project. - Architects, engineers, and other experts from other local departments who had the required expertise with public works in informal settlements, were hired by the department. This participation of external personnel, chosen based on merit and qualifications, provided innovative ways to solve problems by integrating different methods and experiences.	- KENSUP and KISIP were implemented by the Ministry of Housing (MoH) together with the Ministry of Lands. - KISIP was managed by competent personnel from both ministries that were responsible for overall program execution starting from the design to the monitoring and evaluation reporting. - KENSUP was managed by personnel from the Ministry of Housing and the Department of Slum Upgrading established under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing. - The Slum Upgrading Fund was established by GoK and UN-HABITAT to serve as a pool for the funding of slum upgrading and KENSUP was one of them. UN-HABITAT provided the initial funding with subsequent financial support from the National Budget. - For KENSUP, the Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) was composed of the residents and the government operated. - Other institutional aspects of KENSUP included the: Programme Secretariat (in the Ministry), Settlement Project Implementation Unit, Project Implementation Unit and the Interagency Steering Committee (IASC), Local Authorities and UN-HABITAT.	- Baan Mankong enjoyed an institutional flexibility by the implementing agency, CODI which made it easier to adopt an approach seeking pro-poor development by changing the relationship between poor communities and the State. - The structure of CODI's board sought to institutionalize corporations and bring different interest groups together. The board included government representatives, community representatives selected through a People's Forum which included five senior community leaders from each region and functioned as a Community Advisory Committee.
Decentralization	- Local governments became independent of the central	- Kenya shifted from a highly centralized form of	-The need for flexible solutions necessitated that

government. This decentralization of government together with prioritizing urban equity made the Brazilian cities more like an incubator for urban improvement.	governance to a more decentralized one in implementing KISIP and KENSUP.	some Baan Mankong functions which CODI used to carry out at the national level to be decentralized to regional offices. -At the administrative level, CODI advocated developing cooperation between communities and city governments as well as secure tenure for poor communities. -At the community level, CODI mobilized the community through the Baan Mankong community taskforce and empowered community networks. It also generated and strengthened savings groups, and coordinated upgrading activities with academics and planners, government agencies and NGOs and community architects. -Additionally, the project had gradually delegated many of the functions carried out at the community-level to the National Union of Low-Income Housing Community Organizations (NULICO).

Table 5: Summary of the International Experiences Success Factors

Slum Relocation

Mumbai, India

For the sake of presenting more international experiences on different intervention approaches other than the in situ development previously presented in the three cases of Brazil, Kenya and Thailand, the coming lines will present a successful case of relocation in Mumbai, India. In spite of the fact that most opinions oppose the relocation of poor slum dwellers due to the negative impacts on their lives, yet this innovative approach implemented in Mumbai, India, proves that resettlement is not always a failure, especially when adopted wisely and facilitated by community organizations.

Mumbai has a population of around 12 million residents, half of which lived in informal settlements (Dickson, 2002). The city's continuous urban growth was inevitable considering its geographical location that allowed it to function as hub for global trade. Due to the Mumbai's geographical nature and physical limitations, growth of low income settlements was limited and caused the prevalence of settlements suitable for middle and high classes. Besides, most residents preferred to live next to locations near railway facilities because of the availability of job opportunities. Accordingly, illegal settlements were increasingly built around these areas which turned it to be a complex dilemma for the Indian government to deal with (BURRA, 1999).

Considering the fact that the daily operations of the city depended very heavily on the railway system, since almost 7.4 million passenger commuted on a daily basis, this encouraged around 20,000 households to establish their dilapidated huts approximately five meters away from the railway tracks (Dickson, 2002). This resulted in multiple accident incidents for people crossing the railway tracks. The government of India together with the Railway System Authority, in return, enforced instructions for trains not to exceed 15 km speed while passing by populated areas, which caused delay in the schedule of people commuting to work and reduced the efficiency of Mumbai's

railway system. In this respect, a ten meters safety zone on either side of the tracks was created and required to be free of any violations (Patel, 2002).

Actors

The Mumbai's governing bodies set a plan to improve the public transportation system of the city with the help of the municipality of Mumbai and the national government agency of the Indian Railways. For implementation, a loan was received from the World Bank and consequently the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) was launched (BURRA, 1999). An important player in this corporation was Mahila Milan (MM), a Community Based Organization (CBO) consisting of women and slum dwellers whose main concern was forming saving groups and conducting credit activities. Mahila Milan played a major role in empowering women to perform effective roles in the society. The organization had around 300,000 families as members all over the country. Another member of this corporation was The Railway Slum Dwellers Federation (RSDF) which included households residing along the tracks of the railway in Mumbai. This was in addition to the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF).

Objective

The main goal of the MUTP was to improve the railway system of the city by laying new tracks, increasing the number of station platforms as well as reducing overcrowding by increasing the number of cars in the trains. In order to make this happen, twenty thousand poor residents, located along the railway tracks, had to be relocated from their current illegal huts.

Implementation

In accordance to the guidelines stipulated by the World Bank, a national housing policy was issued entailing that the government should avoid forced evictions and take the necessary steps towards working with the community to evacuate priority sites. Meanwhile, in order to secure the rights of slum dwellers, the government launched the Slum Redevelopment Scheme. Such scheme was a positive move towards the State's willingness to look beyond forced evictions. In this regard,

all residents had to be resettled before any work was initiated. An area called Kanjur Marg was selected for temporarily relocating nine hundred families (Patel, 2002). This new site was carefully selected due to its convenient proximity to the residents' original houses.

Before the beginning of the relocation process, the community was consulted by members of the NSDF and MM who visited them for presenting the mission they came for and encouraging a dialogue for ideas and suggestions. The first stage afterwards began with counting and numbering the huts. Groups of 50 individuals were formed from the residents to share and validate the collected data. Charts and displaying materials were also available during the meetings with the representatives for the sake of clarification. After that, the groups of residents formed 27 housing cooperatives that were entitled to visit the new site and select the exact areas to move to. In addition, they determined when and how the relocation should take place. On the specified date, the transition went smoothly and did not involve any problems (BURRA, 1999). The exact process was repeated until the relocation of 20,000 people was realized.

The temporary housing of Kanjur Marg was only a transitional period, for 2-3 years only, until they participate in the designing and construction of their permanent houses, in the same new location, with the help of NSDF. The project was a bit criticized for providing very small spaces of 12 square meters for each household during the transitional period, yet the residents themselves were satisfied considering the fact that they were moved from very small and deteriorated houses to more safe and secure areas with full access to basic facilities (Patel, 2002).

Factors of Success

The issuance of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy in 1997 was one of the main success elements of the project. The policy necessitated that the relocation, if inevitable, should be in the proximity of the current locations and that security of tenure for residents was to be granted. In addition, the relocation should improve their living standards. Another fundamental success factor in this project was community participation from the very beginning of the project. Involving the

community in every single detail starting from the idea to the complete implementation was behind the success of the project. Moreover, people moved from their poor shacks voluntarily after being consulted and involved in the decision making process. The housing cooperatives that were organized by the community were consulted regarding the space allocated for each family, participated in purchasing the material and monitoring the work of the contractors and even provided manpower to help the contractor finalize the work on time. Furthermore, the partnership between the government and community organizations embodied in the MM and NSDF provided valuable information on land acquisitions and titles. Thus, the community was empowered to assume responsibilities which facilitated the process of relocation.

Another major and unique factor in the case of Mumbai was the serious involvement of the MM women. It was estimated that 80% of the community leaders were actually women who were constantly concerned with saving for future requirements (Dickson, 2002).

Regarding the issue of providing the needed maintenance and security to the place, the MM established a Central Committee to assume these roles. The Central Committee carried out a process of combating pests on a weekly basis to keep the area clean of serious diseases. Additionally, the Committee hired security guards to keep the place free of crime, yet serious problems were addressed to the Police Authority.

Overcoming Difficulties

It was expected that the process of relocating 20,000 individuals would involve a number of problems. For example, after resettling in the permanent housing, people started to complain about cost of living and lack of job opportunities (Patel, 2002). They explained that before relocating, they shared access to different amenities such as water and electricity, but after relocating, they had to pay for these costs individually. In response, the Mahila Milan interfered to lessen the transitional economic situation by establishing several ration shops which sell different kinds of commodities at very reduced and subsidized prices. Additionally, Nurseries for the children between two and four

years were established. They accepted children for free to provide an opportunity for households to search for a means of living without having to worry about their children. Furthermore, the Mahila Milan granted loans with easy conditions.

Chapter Five: Case Study and Field Visit

Osman Housing (Masaken Osman)

In order to further assess the most common practice of the Egyptian government towards slums, field work was conducted in Osman Housing as a typical case of relocation. The case study looks into the final outcome of the relocation and not the problems encountered during the process of relocating slum dwellers, including forceful eviction and demolition of slums, which took place few years ago. The purpose of the case study is not to evaluate the alternative public housing project that slum dwellers were moved to. Rather, it focuses on how the various aspects of livelihood of slum dwellers were affected by moving to this project.

Osman buildings are located within the boundaries of 6th of October City. This housing project was part of the national housing program "Awla belra'aya" or the housing for those most in need announced by former President Hosni Mubarak in 2005 which is now home to some of the slum dwellers who were transferred by Cairo Governorate in 2010. The original purpose of this housing program was to solve the problem of housing for the poorest segments of society that cannot support themselves, including the homeless, those households whose house fell and cannot provide shelter, and so forth. These categories later included providing an alternative housing to the inhabitants of informal settlements that should to be relocated from their slums (Tadamun, 2015).

Osman buildings went through several changes since their establishment; they were originally intended to provide affordable housing for very poor families. At present, the current inhabitants came from different regions and cities seeking affordable housing. Because of fears of another disaster, Cairo Governorate began to evacuate people living next to the rockslide from their homes as well as some living in unsafe areas like Istabl Antar and moved them to the units established in Osman buildings in 6th of October City (Tadamun, 2015).

Field Visit

Data Collection

Two field visits were conducted to Osman Buildings. The observations of the site were as follows. Upon arrival at the place, one can notice the very similar six-storey buildings that differ only in the façade color, in addition to few scattered shops and cafes. Every group of buildings is very close to one another and separated by pathways and large space areas. Such large spaces that should be safe playground places for children in fact turned to be full of sewage water and garbage. One can also see that residents used other areas for raising chicken. Besides children hang around and play between piles of garbage and stray dogs without any control. One can easily get a sense of insecurity due to the emptiness of the surrounding areas and the absence of distinctive characteristics of the place.

Physical adaptation by the residents to create commercial slots in the area
Photo taken by the author, May 2016

Signs of neglect and garbage accumulation
Photo taken by the author, May 2016

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten families who have been living in the place from 3-5 years and were willing to share their opinions and volunteer to participate in the study. The semi-structure qualitative interview consisted of 8 questions (see Appendix). Each interview was carefully recorded and transcribed. While conducting the interviews, the respondents gave almost the same answers to the questions. This high extent of agreement between the answers gave the feeling that sufficient data saturation was achieved.

Findings

During the interviews, the following categories/themes emerged and corresponding codes that could be used to organize and sort the data were developed:

Location, poor infrastructure and the lack of basic services

The remoteness of Osman Buildings and their isolation from different areas of livelihood represents a fatal problem to the residents which is very difficult to deal with. Besides, the area lacks facilities, effective services and employment opportunities. Since the establishment of the buildings in 2012, there haven't been any schools or operating medical centers. In spite of the fact that there is a health unit that was established since 2012, it was not operated until 2015, but still it is for limited use only, not adequately or fully equipped or prepared for complete operation.

"The government threw us here in the desert in the middle of nowhere,"
said an old man.

"Many of us who have been relocated from Manshiet Nasser, Ezbet Khairallah,
Dar El Salam and Istabl Anatar did not stay in the area for long as they found
the quality of housing and sometimes the location not convenient for them.
They left the units allocated to them and rented them through subcontractors,"
said a mother in one of the families.

"We should have never been relocated by the government before having

such services operating,"

said one of Osman Housing residents.

Another resident said, *"My son was sick and I had to take him to Kasr ElEini*

Hospital as the medical unit is not operating. Doctors are scared of working

here and we want them to know that we will protect them and the whole

medical unit with our lives, we just need them to come and serve our

needs."

All respondents advised that isolation, remoteness, difficulties of reaching the nearest schools, jobs, health facilities and staying connected with other communities were major challenges facing them. Children have serious health problems since access to health services is not easy due to the absence of transportation and the difficulty to reach the nearest public health unit. Besides, regular vaccination campaigns do not reach this area.

Absence of public transportation

Adding to the problems, the absence of public transportation is another critical issue to the residents. The tuk-tuk is the only means of transportation available to residents of the buildings. Most of the dwellers are very poor and cannot bear the high transport costs to do the simplest tasks, such as buying food at reasonable prices or go to work or to school or get medical care.

"I go on foot to the other side of the buildings where the nearest pharmacy is located,

which is very far and scary and if I decide to take the only available transportation

means, tuk-tuk, I have to pay L.E. 3 per ride which is too much and we cannot afford it,"

said an old woman.

Besides, for children in particular, access to the nearest schools is not only costly, but it is dangerous as well since children have to cross El Wahat El Bahareya highway, which lacks any

pedestrian safe crossing areas. This causes a serious concern to the people as they witnessed many tragic accidents that caused the deaths of many children in the area.

Irregular water supply

Another major problem that has a serious impact on the living conditions of the inhabitants is the irregular water supply as almost daily they are subject to water cuts for several hours and sometimes for several days. All the interviewees said that the water was cut off for a whole month during the summer of 2014 which pushed the residents to close El Wahat El Bahareya road and the police arrested many of these protesters and referred them to public prosecution. To date, the problem of interrupted water supply still exists.

"We have no regular water supply here, we cannot cook, we cannot take showers,
we have to walk very long distances to the neighborhoods to bring water on a daily basis,"
said a young woman.

Absence of security

Area residents generally feel insecure as a result of the isolation from other neighborhoods of the area along with the absence of a police station and the negligence of the authorities to the region which resulted in the prevalence of bullying and violence in the area. The respondents said that there are a lot of drug dealers and gangs in the area.

Another dimension of the feeling of insecurity is the problem of tenure. This is due to the fact that the leasing contracts granted by the governorate is only temporary and they are questioning why they were asked to pay rentals while they should own the property as promised by the government when they evacuated them from their original houses.

The size of the housing units

All apartments have a unified size of 42 square meters, since it was planned to be temporary housing for those in need with a view of moving to other more stable housing options.

The tiny size of the housing unit is very annoying to the residents. They pointed out that bedrooms are too small for their families. Om Ahmed is an example of a mother to a family consisting of eight individuals started complaining about the inadequacy of the space to her family and the fact that they have to endure inappropriate and unhealthy sleeping conditions. She also mentioned that bathrooms space is very uncomfortable and hinders movement.

"They gave us this very small apartment and we are a family consisting of 8 members.

My husband and I sleep in one room and my six kids scattered all over the place,"

Om Ahmed said.

Limited Job opportunities

The residents of Osman buildings also suffer from the difficulty of getting a job in order to earn their living. Some of them opened kiosks and small commercial projects in the area and others look for work in the vicinity factories as laborers, cleaners and security staff in shopping malls and other professions that do not require specific skills. Those who had a chance to work complain of very low wages and those who opened a small business complain about the very limited income they get that does not make ends meet for a living.

"We cannot find jobs, our children cannot find jobs either. Our life and jobs

were in Duwaika, we have nothing here,"

said one of Osman Housing residents.

The area does not include spaces for commercial activities which urged some inhabitants to build their own stores. This lack of employment opportunities makes the area insufferable for the already financially-struggling population.

Negative impression towards the area

Residents also complain form the negative impression the people outside the area got about them. This is due to the existence of some elements of crime and the drug dealers. They said that this generalized perception about the whole region was not fair and causes much harm

to them who are already disadvantaged. This leads to further marginalization of the region and its inhabitants.

> *"People look at us as if we are criminals because there are some drug dealers*
> *and thugs living among us which has a very negative impact on our lives. There*
> *is no police even to protect us from the real criminals,"*

a young girl said.

Discussion and Data Analysis

The interviews conducted with the residents of Osman Housing produced important data that help better understand their problems and needs after relocation. Although the project of Osman Buildings was intended to provide a solution by the Egyptian government to the problems of unsafe areas in Cairo, the region later became a problem in itself. The construction of housing units did not solve the housing crisis for the slum residents. The resettlement of residents of unsafe areas perhaps allowed the authorities to wash their hands of the consequences of another potential disaster like the Duwaika one. The process of relocation and lack of follow up on the conditions of the population afterwards contributed to worsening the crisis.

All the interviewed residents feel marginalized and do not have a sense of belonging neither to the place nor the population as a whole and above all, they do not trust the government. They are actually convinced that the government is against their wellbeing and existence through their common solution to get rid of them and move them to remote areas.

The area's current situation and the daily struggles that the residents have to go through to get the basic services and even to move from one place to another, as witnessed through the field visits and interviews, show the deficiency of the current governance process in dealing with such problems. The fact that Osman Buildings is a poor suburban area which is inconveniently far from residential and commercial activities on the fringes of 6th of October city has made it

among the most under-resourced and disadvantaged districts of the city. This also shows the state's inability to plan for urban development to offer an alternative to the deteriorated conditions of slums and informal settlements dwellers. The ineffective planning and decision making is a continuation of the government negligence strategy that has been adopted for years. This is shown in the inadequate 42 square meter size of the units decided to be assigned to the dwellers disregarding the fact that many families consist of more than four persons. Failure of the government's ability to care for people's needs is even shown in the process of allocating the units to each family. This was clearly exemplified in allocating an apartment on the sixth floor to an elderly woman instead of giving her an apartment on the ground floor.

The officials of Cairo governorate made the decision to move people from their life threatening houses to Osman Buildings assuming that the area was fully prepared and equipped to receive this large number of inhabitants while this was not the reality on the grounds. The project did not study or anticipate the socio-economic impact of moving the inhabitants from their own homes where they had sources of livelihood to a completely isolated and remote area like Osman buildings which lacked and still lacks a lot of amenities and basic services like any other informal areas discussed earlier in this paper. What is more ironic is that due to the government's negligence and lack to services, the area exhibits features of informality that are very close to the areas from which the inhabitants were transferred. It is worth noting here John Turner's very early argument comparing the "supportive shack" and the "oppressive house". He demonstrated through field work in Latin America that a supportive shack in a slum provided means of livelihood; shelter, close location to services and jobs at a minimum cost (Mehlomakulu, 1999). He believed that such shacks provided admirable support for low-income population and met their expectations. In terms of cost, Turner argued that shacks could be constructed according to the resident's needs; shack residents can build their houses at a minimum cost less than a modern residence would cost. This is due to cheaper materials and

cheaper labor costs. In contrast, and as the case study of Osman Housing demonstrated, the oppressive house offered by the government lacked all the previous elements of livelihood. It is unsatisfactory as it is not built as per people's needs; it is usually built as uniform structures. As shown in the case study, families spend most of their income on rentals and service payments due to the fact that security of tenure is missing from the project.

In addition and as per the data collected from the interviewees, the process of relocating the inhabitants from their original homes to Masaken Osman was conducted very quickly and unprofessionally. The fact that they were given a notice two days only prior to the move, and no details about the place to which they were going to be relocated was available is reflecting the deficiency of the government's approach in handling emergencies. What even caused more harm is that when they arrived at the place, they were shocked by the fact that they moved to the middle of nowhere, not in the heart of 6th of October City as promised.

While the government always considers that relocation would have a positive impact on inhabitants since they are supposed to be relocated in better housing units away from environmental hazards, yet they ignore their social bonds, access to public and private affordable transportation and reasonably priced markets to get their needs from. The government focuses only on the shortcomings of the informal settlement from deteriorated housing conditions and environmental dangers, etc. and believes that relocation is a solution to such problems. Nevertheless, and as proven through the case of Osman Housing, this approach fails to acknowledge the real needs of the community and results in making the poor even poorer. Instead of improving the living conditions of poor inhabitants, irrational relocation often increases poverty by ignoring the socio-economic background of the inhabitants.

The current situation in Osman Buildings is a direct result of an authoritarian governance structure. The government's adopted top-down planning approach resulted in utter disregard for citizens' right to adequate housing, which includes many socio-economic considerations other than the housing units only. Although such an approach usually proved failure, the Egyptian government still insists on implementing it. This led to worsening the inhabitants' situation rather than providing solutions for them. This shows that this planning approach relied mainly on assumptions instead of conducting a thorough understanding of the needs of the targeted beneficiaries. In order to implement quick solutions for economic or political gains leaves complex and changing realities ignored and revolves grievances of inhabitants.

Although the ten families interviewed in this research is relatively a small sample to be representative of all the population impacted by resettlement or eviction, however it is indicative. It is an indication that some of Egypt's poorest citizens who are displaced from their informal residences and from the different sources of social support to which they used to have access suffer devastating consequences and miss a chance of leading a decent quality of life. Given the fact that the Egyptian government's urban policies depend mainly upon eviction and relocation for addressing the problem of slum areas, citizens of such areas in return will continue to suffer and urban policies will continue to fail. Instead, a government approach adopting strategies for upgrading the existing informal areas would offer the possibility of improving housing areas and at the same time imposing minimum costs and social and physical disruption upon citizens. Through in situ development or upgrading, a gradual improvement of existing buildings together with infrastructure are recognized without having to demolish homes, displace residents or disrupt social networks (Mistroa, 2009). Even complete redevelopment of slums in their location (demolishing the slums and constructing new housing in the same location) would maintain the connection of the residents to the place and hence keep their sources of livelihood.

Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

This research aimed at studying the efforts of the Egyptian government for addressing the challenge of slums at the policy and implementation levels. The thesis examined why slums do not develop or improve in spite of all the efforts to do so. It was found that a large percentage of the population in Egypt is subject to long-lasting practices of denial of their full rights of citizenship by government officials, including housing rights. This is clearly shown in the existence of informal unplanned and unsafe areas. Efforts by the government over the past several decades concentrated more on trying to eradicate existing slums by removing them rather than dealing with the original reasons of urban poverty and addressing the socio economic drives that led to the growth of informal areas. Eighty per cent of the government's interventions are basically relocation, without involving the community in the decision making processes of the resettlement which ultimately results in failure, and twenty per cent of the interventions are redevelopment, which is also proved to be unsuccessful in terms of sustainability. The adopted practices should actually be the opposite, i.e. 80% redevelopment of slum areas to be applied in a participatory manner guaranteeing sustainability and 20% only for relocation, when it is inevitable. The government should be committed to address the actual needs of the population based on a thorough understanding, not on the government's interpretation of what their needs are.

The problems caused by the existence of informal settlements are not only due to political reasons; they are also based on lack of design, policy making, communal participation, and above all sustainability. Developing countries around the world, whose experiences were presented in this paper, implemented several solutions to face the problems associated with slums. By presenting and exploring different practices from developing countries and at the same time focusing on understanding some downfalls of a relocation project in Egypt, it was

concluded that the government did not reach the expected results. The approach of relocation should be minimized to the most legitimate cases and when resorted to, residents should be consulted and involved in the selection of the place to which they would be resettled. Those places should provide the needed public services and access to affordable transportation and job opportunities. Therefore, the physical upgrading is only the beginning, school amenities and teacher coaching are needed to address the lack of basic education, health issues need to be tackled by providing clinics, hospitals and health education programs and lastly special programs should be offered to increase income earning opportunities.

The Osman Housing project turned to be a problem in itself; it is an example of the government's failure in dealing with the slum problem. The experiences of the interviewed dwellers and the costs they had to bear and which they pointed out are demonstrating the losses which irrational policies commonly incur upon the people whom such policies are supposed to benefit. Based on the interviews, an unusual intervention that faces all the presented obstacles and reflects the expectations of residents is needed.

Therefore, it is important to carefully understand the elements of failure and try to learn from them. This, in turn, should ensure the success of the future interventions in the area and in other areas as well. The case of Osman Housing highlights the paradox between ambitious development programs that may seem wisely planned and the real outcomes on the grounds.

Overall, and in light of the analysis of the current government's approaches in dealing with the problem, the international experiences, field study and interviews with the dwellers of Osman Housing, productive efforts between the people and government need to be encouraged through effective collaboration between representatives of different fields. The significance of the findings is to draw the attention for a potential solution to the issues facing slums through learning from international experiences which proved that it is more vital to build the capacities of households and communities before the houses. The Egyptian citizen has got a right and at the

same time has to play a role. Dealing with slums should never be driven by the fact that it is a problem and that the government needs to get rid of it; the idea of "slum elimination" is not ideal, it should be "how to deal with informal settlements". It is not an urban problem in essence; it is rather a socio-economic one that has negative consequences on buildings and urban areas. In addition, the problem of distrust between the government and citizens should be resolved. There is a huge gap in this respect that can be filled by NGOs and civil society organizations that play the role of mediation and presenting the different methods of development to the citizens, who may in many cases, be reluctant to accept such changes.

International practices show that engaging the targeted community and improving their capacities and awareness is essential for a successful upgrading or resettlement. Project management should give slum residents the feeling of ownership of the whole project and allow them to participate in the decision making process. In other words, priorities should be identified before starting. It is concluded that there is a need to endorse, review and enhance the existing policies and strategies as well as the current efforts of dealing with slums in Egypt. Egypt is still far from the global context in dealing with slums and informal areas.

Recommendations

The recommendations to the Egyptian government proposed in this section will be responding to the learned lessons and success factors of the four international experiences introduced earlier in the thesis. This will also be based on the realities and findings reflected in the literature review, field work and case study.

Political and institutional support

In general, for any upgrading process or intervention to be strategic and successful, there are a number of necessary prerequisites that need to be present within any project. As a start, any government should recognize the existence of slums and that upgrading is a necessary means of intervention to address the poor living conditions in such places. In light of the four international cases demonstrated in this thesis; any project should be endorsed by political and institutional support from the government to all involved partners. It is crucial that the program gets the political will and obligation of the government and the participating local entities. For implementation, the role of local authorities is crucial in each phase.

In the case of Rio de Janeiro, for example, political and institutional commitment were shown in the fact that the Favela Bairro program was exclusively instituted according to a local government policy decision, and implemented by personnel from the Municipal government. This atypical institutional set up was possible because in Brazil, municipalities are autonomous entities which allowed for enough autonomy to design and execute their own public policies apart from the State (Castro, 2009). Thus, the local government of the city undertook complete liability for the development and execution of the program. The government commitment was also represented in allocating a considerable portion of the city's budget to the Housing Department and allowing it to play a central role (Magalhães, 2012).

National strategy for dealing with slums

In light of the above, Egypt needs to provide the necessary political will and institutional support that can be reflected in setting a national strategy for dealing with slums which, in turn, necessitates that the government employs strategic actions at the national, local and governorate levels. Since slum upgrading projects are managed and coordinated at the local level, thus interventions are necessary not only at the local or program level, but also at the level of local government as well as at the central government level where policies and legislations are made and budgets are allocated. The interventions on these levels need to be consistent and complementary to achieve the best results.

In this respect, supportive *institutional reforms* are necessary to include a special budget for slum development within the annual budget of the state. It is also important to encourage governorates to manage their own slum upgrading funds. Additionally, some *legislative reforms* enacting laws that explicitly recognize the rights of slum dwellers are crucial for dealing with slums in Egypt. Besides, coordinating operations between different stakeholders: ISDF, governorates, and concerned ministries is needed (Abdelhalim, 2014).

Community participation

Another important step on the part of the Egyptian government is that it should take necessary actions to encourage community participation as seen in all the four cases of international experiences. Adopting a participatory process and starting with the people not the physical improvement as well as establishing a dialogue for negotiating different options and including dwellers in decision making is essential. In other words, enabling slum dwellers to actively take part in improving their own conditions should be implemented on the grounds. Implementing slum development programs should be relying on a people-centered approach where tools to consult and involve the inhabitants is incorporated throughout the whole process. In other words, in order for any project to succeed and achieve its intended goals, community

involvement is essential. In the meantime, existence of professional expertise is necessary, but must not replace involvement of local communities (Abdelhalim, 2010). Also here comes the role of the central government to support in identifying slum types and characteristics, communicating with slum dwellers to win their trust through implementing a participatory approach, and finally managing and executing slum development projects.

A creative idea such as the housing cooperatives that was applied in the KENSUP program of Kenya is an effective tool for community mobilization. Egypt may apply such a technique as a means for involving the people in upgrading programs. This should also entail raising the awareness of the slum dwellers about the importance of the upgrading process, through campaigns or workshops, like the ones organized within the Favela Bairro project, to structure the process of decision making. This is to avoid any reluctance or resistance on the dwellers part.

Rights based approach

As demonstrated in the four international case studies, slum upgrading should focus on the needs and aspirations of slum dwellers. It should recognize that residents of such locations have the same rights as other citizens in formal areas. Therefore, a rights-based approach should be adopted by the government guaranteeing the following:

- The right to suitable housing which is endorsed by article # 68 in the Egyptian constitution that agrees with the Millennium Development Goals regarding improving living conditions of slum dwellers, Goal 7. This is also in accordance with the new Sustainable Development Goals, Goal # 11, 11.1 stating that "by 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrade slums" (Osborn, 2015).

- The right of security of tenure through titling of land and houses. Upgrading in the sense of providing clean water, adequate sewage disposal and improving the well-

being of the community is crucial, but what is more fundamental is legalizing or regularizing the houses that lack security of tenure (Sims, 2008).

- The right to access to public and government services.

- The right to the city in order to avoid displacement of slum dwellers to remote locations, as seen in the field work and interviews with the dwellers of Osman Housing, and start applying necessary measures for integrating them into the city's society and economy. This social and physical inclusion should be included in any developing or relocating interventions for slum areas (Abdelhalim, 2014).

Promoting continuous training of technical staff

Moreover, as shown in the case of Brazil, promoting continuous training of technical staff was a constructive element in the success of the program. Therefore, the Egyptian government should pay attention to providing adequate training to local government employees and development professionals involved in slum development projects. This will help in spreading the needed knowledge to enable replication of any successful program in future programs.

Planning and financial flexibility

Learning from the CODI experience, flexibility and imposing as few conditions as possible during implementing the program was a success factor. Thus, it is highly recommended for the Egyptian government to follow suit and allow low-income residents, organizations and different stakeholders, the required flexibility to plan for their upgrading program as per their own needs. This would give urban poor residents the opportunity to take active parts in the process of finding a solution. Flexibility is also recommended in terms of unconditional financial management. We should abandon the usual conventional and system-led contracting and supply driven approaches.

In light of the CODI experience, any development process should usually start by gathering information on all households, infrastructure problems, land ownership and housing security. This may be done through a survey that the government together with other stakeholders organizes. This would provide people an opportunity to gather the needed information and learn about the problems of each other and would facilitate developing a plan covering all the areas in need for immediate intervention.

In addition and in light of the successful Indian experience of relocating some residents in Mumbai in contrast to the complex situation of Osman Housing, it is crucial that basic public services such as health, water, and education are provided to make it a more habitable place for its residents. The provision of public transport services is also essential in order to lessen the transportation cost which is considered a real burden on the residents. This would increase their sense of security to get better connected with other areas and would also facilitate their movement and access to educational and employment opportunities.

Moreover, the government should also seek a different decision-making process to effectively address the issue. Osman Housing exemplifies how thoughtless and inconsiderate top-down approaches can lead to disasters. Therefore, a people-centered rights-based approach is needed. An understanding of all the circumstances of the area should be developed by decision makers. In order to do that, the advice and cooperation of local NGOs working on the site of any informal areas should be sought and welcomed. Besides, the cooperation of other actors such as 6th of October City Development Agency as well as local residents themselves to address this problem is crucial.

Further to the above recommendations based on the learned lessons from the international experiences, the next few lines will present another set of general recommendations to the Egyptian government that deal with the framework conditions and prerequisites for adopting the success factor of international experience:

Comprehensive and sustainable housing policies to overcome the urban divide and Promote social integration:

The divide which exists between the poor and non-poor areas needs to be acknowledged and adequate investment in informal areas should be encouraged to reach an inclusive city where amenities, services and resources are accessible on a more equitable basis. Inclusiveness policies and strategies should be based on a clear vision of how economic, social and political equality can be integrated into the daily lives of the citizens of Egypt. The public transport systems of the new remote areas should also be enhanced to achieve inclusion into the city (Runkel, 2009).

A feasible and applicable social housing policy is needed to provide a broader variety of housing options to meet the requirements of the urban poor. Development of sustainable communities should be the main concern of the new social housing programs. The focus should never be on the production of houses only; enabling individuals and families to work and earn money is the actual success benchmark. Besides, regulating the distortions of the housing market would normally improve access to housing by all income categories (Khalifa, 2011).

Promoting urban planning policies to improve opportunities

Since Cairo is an expanding city which continues to spread outwards, and in order to avoid further division between spaces, it is highly recommended to avoid uncontrolled and unplanned urban sprawl. A positive approach to densification should be adopted by the government to reduce urban sprawl. For instance, the number of underutilized and vacant housing units should be reduced to the minimum by enacting the necessary policies and action plans. Proximity of services and facilities together with avoiding zoning would also help reduce urban disparities (Runkel, 2009).

The increase and prevalence of informal settlements needs to be addressed though more comprehensive activation of existing legislation and more alternative housing options for the poor. Moreover, affordable serviced land for the poor should be more available. In this sense,

there is an urgent need to produce social or low-cost housing and offering loans and credits accessible to the urban poor as well as the middle class (Nada, 2014).

Good governance to bridge the urban disparity

In order for all citizens to enjoy urban equality, local authorities should work closely with national government bodies and civil society to implement inclusive policies for land use, planning, housing, etc. This should be supported by less bureaucratic management and more positive reforms in favor of the urban poor. Improving monitoring of urban change, controlling vacant and public land as well as preventing squatting on the part of the government are fundamental steps towards realizing a slum prevention strategy. Nevertheless, a good governance approach should not only encourage applying the rule of law to halt potential establishment of slums, but it should also be responsive to the needs of citizens and allow them to communicate those needs. Such a change in governance and urban management is much needed and will eventually lead to a significant development in avoiding slum formation by responding to slum dwellers' needs (Tadamun, 2015).

Slum upgrading should involve a number of stakeholders; it entails not only an active role from the government, but also real participation of the civil society and private sector. Good governance principles should help these stakeholders to actively interact within the frame of the slum development strategy. Moreover, good governance should include transparency, accountability, equity, rule of law, participation, responsiveness and a mechanism for combating corruption in order to achieve sustainability of slum upgrading programs (Abdelhalim, 2014). It is important that public service is conducted in a way where relevant information is available and understandable by the citizens. It is also crucial that officials be accountable for their actions by following the established rules, regulations and procedures. Rule of law should be applicable to all governmental processes to guarantee a just and fair state. Responsiveness to people's

demands is also important for good governance to be realized. This also entails effective measure for combating corruption in public service to avoid misuse of public properties or services.

To sum up, the most significant aspect for success is involvement and commitment by the government, the community organizations and the residents. Besides, people should seek the upgrading and understand its value. For implementation, the institutional arrangements should be executed correctly. In other words, incentives should be granted to different agencies to work with the poor, necessary coordination and dissemination of information should be recognized amongst different stakeholders and clearly define the roles of the various agencies (Runkel, 2009).

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Appendix

Interview Questions with the dwellers of Osman Housing:

1- Where have you lived before coming to Osman Housing?

2- How long have you been here?

3- How many members does your family consist of?

4- How were you notified about evicting your houses and the resettlement process?

5- Did the government help you move your stuff from your old houses to Osman Buildings?

6- Did you agree on the eviction and settlement decisions? Were you part of the decision making?

7- What do you feel about the new place? Is it satisfactory to you and your family's needs in

   terms of services and job opportunities?

8- Do you think it was the right decision by the government to relocate you?